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1. INTRODUCTION 
Following the revolutions of 1989 and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, the newly independent countries set out on a 
programmatic path of reform and transition to democracy and a 
market economy.  The transitions in Central and Eastern Europe 
(“CEE”), however, were unique in that they consisted of a “triple 
transition”:  the simultaneous marketization, democratization, and 
state-building of a country.1  An essential, yet underemphasized 
element of this cumbersome and complex transition process was 
judicial reform.2  The normative residuum of the communist policy 
 
1 See generally Nicholas Barr, From Transition to Accession, in LABOR MARKETS 
AND SOCIAL POLICY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: THE ACCESSION AND BEYOND 
(Nicholas Barr ed., 2005) (discussing social policy reform during and after 
European Union (“EU”) accession and strategic reform policies directed at 
accommodating constraints imposed by EU accession); LESZEK BALCEROWICZ, 
SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM, TRANSFORMATION 146 (1995) (highlighting the emergence 
of democratization before capitalization and the interplay of market-oriented 
reforms under a democratic regime as distinguishing factors in the Central and 
Eastern Europe transformations); Claus Offe, Capitalism by Democratic Design? 
Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe, 58 SOC. RES. 865 
(1991) (discussing the role of democratization in the transition from socialist to 
capitalist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe).  During communism, the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe were politicized by the communist 
monopoly and were perceived as illegitimate by a significant portion of the 
population.  Thus, a major goal of the transition in Eastern Europe was re-
legitimizing or rebuilding the state. See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS OF 
POSTMODERNITY 156–74 (2001); Ken Jowitt, The Leninist Legacy, in EASTERN EUROPE 
IN REVOLUTION 207 (Ivo Banac ed., 1992); Peter Evans, The Eclipse of the State? 
Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization, 50 WORLD POL. 62 (1997); Anna 
Gryzmala-Busse & Pauline Jones-Luong, Reconceptualising the State: Lessons from 
Post-Communism, 30 POL. & SOC’Y 529 (2002). 
2 This is not to say that constitutionalism has not been the focus of a rigorous 
academic debate.  See, e.g., JON ELSTER, CLAUS OFFE & ULRICH K. PREUSS, 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: REBUILDING THE SHIP AT SEA 
63–108 (1998) (discussing constitution making and the emergence of democratic 
institutions, capital markets, and social policies in Eastern European countries); 
László Bruszt & David Stark, Remaking the Political Field in Hungary: From the 
Politics of Confrontation to the Politics of Competition, in EASTERN EUROPE IN 
REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 13 (outlining the influence of electoral structure and 
competition on transition periods in Eastern Europe); Kim Lane Scheppele, A 
Comparative View of the Chief Justice’s Role: Guardians of the Constitution: 
Constitutional Court Presidents and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet 
Europe, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1757 (2006) (discussing the role of constitutional courts 
in former Soviet countries); Shannon Ishiyama Smithey & John Ishiyama, Judicious 
Choices: Designing Courts in Post-Communist Politics, 33 COMMUNIST & POST-
COMMUNIST STUD. 163 (2000) (detailing the design and role of judicial institutions 
and constitutional powers in post-communist politics); Gerald M. Easter, 
Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS, 49 
WORLD POL. 184 (1997) (discussing the institutional choice and comparative 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/4
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of marginalizing and politicizing the judiciary and its 
corresponding institutions was a significant obstacle to the 
establishment of a legitimate legal system capable of independent 
judicial review. 
Precisely how courts establish judicial independence during 
the transitions in the CEE countries has remained largely 
unexplored.  The most notable empirical and theoretical studies on 
judicial transition have focused on the formalistic aspects of legal 
systems.3  According to these studies, the primary determinative 
factor leading to an independent, legitimate judiciary in a post-
communist country has been the formulation of the legal system at 
the constitutional level.4  The dispositive factor in such studies 
usually is the presence or absence of a constitutional court, 
insulated from the other components of the judicial system and 
vested with the sole authority on questions of constitutional 
interpretation.5 
However, several empirical studies refute this position.  Several 
authors have demonstrated a statistical link between the de facto 
 
presidentialism in former Soviet countries); Matthew S. Shugart, Executive-
Legislative Relations in Post-Communist Europe, TRANSITION, Dec. 13, 1996, at 6; Jon 
Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364 
(1995) (providing an overview of the mechanics of constitution-making); Juan 
Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J. DEMOCRACY 51 (1990) (discussing the success 
of parliamentary democracies over presidential democracies in guaranteeing 
stability).  The focus here, however, is a broader perspective on judicial transition.  
This includes not only de jure constitutionalism, but also the operation of the 
judicial system after the legal system had been constituted. 
3 See, e.g., HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN 
POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (2000) (providing an overview of the establishment and 
behavior of constitutional courts in transitional regimes); Herman Schwartz, 
Surprising Success: The New Eastern European Constitutional Courts, in THE SELF-
RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 195 
(Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999) [hereinafter  
Schwartz, Surprising Success] (detailing the success of Easter European 
Constitutional Courts in establishing rule of law); Herman Schwartz, Eastern 
Europe’s Constitutional Courts, 9 J. DEMOCRACY 100 (1998) [hereinafter Schwartz, 
Eastern European Courts] (discussing the remarkable performance and stability of 
Eastern European Courts); Albert P. Melone, The Struggle for Judicial Independence 
and the Transition Toward Democracy in Bulgaria, 29 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST 
STUD. 231 (1996) (arguing that separate budget for the judiciary, tenure for judges, 
method for judicial selection is necessary for an independent judiciary). 
4 See, e.g., Schwartz, Surprising Success, supra note 3; Schwartz, Eastern 
European Courts, supra note 3. 
5 See Schwartz, Surprising Success, supra note 3, at 210 (discussing the 
importance of having a constitutional court with the power of judicial review over 
legislative and executive acts).  
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effectiveness of legal institutions and economic performance 
measurements.6  When compared to measurements of how the 
legal system is formally composed (de jure constitutionalism), 
several studies have demonstrated that how well a legal system 
actually functions has a stronger correlation with economic 
growth, the enforcement of private property rights, and indicators 
of the rule of law.7 
However, a theory of judicial independence which incorporates 
the modus operandi of the court system over time has yet to be 
developed; the scholarly literature on the subjects lacks a 
consensus on how legitimate, independent, judicial review is 
established and even measured.8  Substantial questions remain as 
 
6 See Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, Law and Finance in 
Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325, 328 (2000); Lars P. Feld & Stefan 
Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence Using a 
New Set of Indicators, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 497, 516 (2003) (assessing how judicial 
independence affects economic growth).  This is not to say that that a correlation 
between de jure constitutionalism has not been statistically linked to economic 
growth.  Several studies have measured the legal origin of various economic 
factors (e.g., investor protection, the quality of legal enforcement, and the 
concentration of corporate ownership). Various studies have argued that 
countries with common law legal origins have the strongest creditor protection, 
and German and Scandinavian legal models have the strongest law enforcement, 
whereas the French civil-law model performed the worst in terms of legal 
enforcement and investor protection.  Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. 
POL. ECON. 1113, 1117–34 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance]; 
Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1137–39 
(1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants].  The implication of these 
studies is that de jure constitutionalism retains some explanatory power regarding 
its effect on economic performance. 
7 For example, one study demonstrated the high level of de jure legal 
protection in the Commonwealth of Independent States did not correlate with a 
similar degree of legal effectiveness; suggesting that the law-on-the-books is not a 
substitute for a de facto legal effectiveness.  Pistor et al., supra note 6, at 356. 
8 See Nancy Maveety & Anke Grosskopf, “Constrained” Constitutional Courts 
as Conduits for Democratic Consolidation, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 463, 466–69 (2004) 
(discussing the role and scope of the judiciary in a consolidating versus 
established democracy).  Studies have taken a multitude of approaches to 
measuring judicial independence. Several studies have looked to the legal 
tradition on which the constitution is based.  See Feld & Voight, supra note 6, at 
515; La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 6, at 1117–26, 1151–52; La Porta et 
al., Legal Determinants, supra note 6, at 1138–39.  Other studies have measured 
legal effectiveness by: (1) a rule of law indicator; (2) effectiveness of bankruptcy 
law; and (3) survey data on the effectiveness of the protection of property rights.  
See Pistor et al., supra note 6, at 332–41.  Paolo Mauro looked to the “efficiency and 
integrity of the legal environment as it affects business.”  Paolo Mauro, Corruption 
and Growth, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681, 684 (1995).  Feld and Voight looked to informal 
social sanctions, judges’ term lengths and judges’ income.  Feld & Voight, supra 
note 6, at 516. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/4
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to how court, over time, can create their own legitimacy and 
independence from political and popular pressure on both 
normative and practical levels.  This Article aims to develop an 
interpretive theory of judicial independence by examining the role 
of international law in the jurisprudence of constitutional tribunals 
with differing systems of judicial review in a comparative context. 
This Article takes an interdisciplinary approach to unpacking 
the development of judicial independence as a component of 
economic, political, and social transition.  Rather than employing a 
strict jurisprudential study of the mechanisms of judicial 
transitions, I incorporate studies from the economic and political 
science disciplines which shed light on the confluence of judicial, 
economic, and political transitions.  These empirical studies also 
provide statistical evidence in support of some of propositions 
contained within this Article.  Thus, Section 2 of this Article will 
examine the role of judicial independence in both the economic 
and political transitions unique to the nations of CEE.  Indeed, 
much of the literature on various elements of the economic 
transitions of CEE focuses on the necessities of good corporate 
governance, minimizing corruption, and a sound institutional 
framework.  Paramount to this study is investigating the normative 
environment which existed under communism, in conjunction 
with that which existed at the commencement of the CEE 
transitions.  To that end, this Article analyzes the communist 
social, economic, political and judicial legacies from which I hope 
to extrapolate those variables most central to establishing judicial 
independence. 
Building on the identification of those variables potentially 
conducive to creating judicial independence, Section 3 outlines a 
methodology for analyzing how judicial independence is 
established in practice.  This Section examines the systemic effects 
on democratization and its consolidation as well as a method of 
measuring judicial independence in practice.  Section 3 looks to 
instances of countermajoritiarian rulings—instances in which 
courts of a transition country ruled against popular pressure 
stemming from either the elected government or popular 
support—as the starting point of how courts establish judicial 
independence.  Juridical patterns can then be identified and 
examined in light of systemic indicators of judicial reform, such as 
formal structure of the judiciary and the nexus between domestic 
and international law. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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Section 4 examines two case studies:  the Lithuanian 
Constitutional Court and the Estonian Supreme Court.  Both of 
these countries have similar normative experiences as constituent 
components of the Soviet Union, yet adopted dissimilar judicial 
structures and procedures.  As such, a comparative study between 
these two countries will be helpful in deducing conclusions by 
looking for patterns and dissimilarities in their courts’ reasoning 
while controlling for systemic variables of their legal systems.  
Specifically, this Article argues that the development of an 
independent judiciary in Estonia and Lithuania was done through 
utilizing, what I have termed, “external source legitimacy.”  By 
interpreting domestic constitutional norms in light of nonbinding 
international law, national courts can largely deflect political and 
popular pressures while simultaneously asserting their own 
legitimacy as a dispute arbiter.  Some concluding remarks follow. 
2.  JUDICIAL LEGACIES AND REFORMS 
Any analysis of judicial reform must necessarily account for 
two things:  the starting point of the reform and the end result.  A 
discussion of the communist legacy and the challenges which the 
CEE nations faced at the commencement of their transition 
programs is useful in ascertaining what variables of reform are 
appropriate for analysis.  As will be evident in this Section, any 
concept of meaningful judicial independence was lacking under 
the Soviet system of government.  Indeed, the concept of judicial 
review was foreign to domestic courts.  Yet it was vital—both 
economically and politically—that the reform packages of the CEE 
nations adopted at the outset of their transitions establish judicial 
review and judicial independence.  Thus, the following Sections 
examine the Soviet judiciary, its normative underpinnings, and its 
legacy in light of the greater reform packages implemented by the 
former Warsaw Pact countries and newly independent states after 
independence from the Soviet Union. 
2.1. The Communist Judicial Legacy 
The newly independent states of CEE had little experience with 
judicial independence and review because of the legacy of 
communism.  Although some countries had previously 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/4
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experimented with judicial review, such as Poland,9 most of the 
countries to gain independence from the Soviet Union were devoid 
of any normative and institutional foundations of an independent 
judiciary.  The transition to democracy, its consolidation, and the 
creation of a market-based economy required these institutions to 
be created, maintained, and adapted over time. 
Judicial review can be loosely defined as “any judicial action 
that involves the review of an inferior legal norm for conformity 
with a higher one, with the implicit possibility that the reviewing 
court may invalidate or suspend the inferior norm if necessary or 
desirable.”10  It is a beautifully simple concept; the judiciary of a 
nation adjudges the actions of its executive and legislative 
branches.  Yet this concept has evolved and been explored over 
many generations and in many different societies. 
Judicial review in the Soviet Union and in the Warsaw Pact 
states was conspicuously absent.  The communist system rejected 
law (at least as originating from a judiciary) as a fundamental 
component of statehood.11  This is evidenced, inter alia, by the 
Soviet Supreme Court’s proclamation that “Communism means 
not the victory of socialist law, but the victory of socialism over 
any law.”12  Legislative bodies were recognized as the ultimate 
expression of the will of the people and were accordingly beyond 
 
9 See Mark F. Brzezinski & Leszek Garlicki, Judicial Review in Post-Communist 
Poland: The Emergence of a Rechtsstaat?, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 13 (1995) (discussing the 
establishment and evolution of judicial review in Poland).  In 1985 Poland created 
the Constitutional Tribunal (“Trybunał Konstytucyjny”) that was empowered to 
adjudicate certain claims separate from the legislative function of government.  Id. 
at 21–24.  Although vested with limited jurisdiction, the Tribunal protected 
legislative acts from inconsistent regulations issued by administrative agencies 
and established the normative seeds that would germinate into judicial review in 
a post-communist Poland.  Id. at 25–30.  See also Mark F. Brezinksi, Note, 
Constitutional Heritage and Renewal: The Case of Poland, 77 VA. L. REV. 49, 51–86 
(1991) (reviewing the Polish constitutional history, illustrating Poland’s long-
lasting national attachment to constitutional principles); Andrzej Rapaczynski, 
Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the Constitutional Committee of the Polish 
Parliament, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 595, 608 (1991) (examining constitutional questions of 
the institutional structure of the Polish state). 
10 Robert F. Utter & David C. Lundsgaard, Judicial Review in the New Nations 
of Central and Eastern Europe: Some Thoughts from a Comparative Perspective, 54 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 559, 561 (1993). 
11 Yuri Feofanov, The Establishment of the Constitutional Court in Russia and the 
Communist Party Case, 19 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 623, 628 (1993). 
12 HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.:  AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET 
LAW 26 (Rev. ed. 1963). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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the reach of judicial restraint.13  The legislature was given 
responsibility for maintaining constitutionality, resulting in the 
absence of judicial review of legislative enactments.  The court 
system did not adjudicate claims between individuals and the 
government; citizens were to take their grievance to the bureau 
with supervisory authority over the body responsible for the 
harm.14 
Indeed, the concept of separation of powers was foreign to the 
classical communist system.15  The conceptualization of communist 
“law” was synonymous with legislation and other acts of the 
legislative body.  The judiciary was at best a peripheral body with 
limited influence within the communist system.  
Countermajoritarian rulings by a judicial tribunal were absent in 
the communist system in both practice and at a normative level. 
This system was maintained despite Gorbachev’s reforms 
aimed at moving the system towards a “law-based state” 
(“pravovoe gosudarstvo”).16  A Committee for Constitutional 
Supervision was established and began experimenting with basic 
judicial review, declaring edicts of the Soviet President 
unconstitutional.  However, the fundamental belief that the 
legislature was the supreme expression of the will of the people 
persisted throughout the reform process.  Consequentially, the 
 
13 JOHN N. HAZARD, WILLIAM E. BUTLER & PETER B. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL 
SYSTEM: THE LAW IN THE 1980’S 32 (1984).  As Stalinist-era jurist criticized judicial 
review by arguing that: 
Every sort of statute [in bourgeois countries] is considered as having 
force until it occurs to some private person or capitalist enterprise to file 
a petition in court to have it . . . declared unconstitutional.  Naturally this 
right is broadly used by monopolist cliques of exploiters to obtain a 
declaration of “unconstitutionality” as to laws running counter to their 
interests. 
ANDREI Y. VYSHINSKY, THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE 339–40 (1948).  See also MARY 
A. GLENDON, MICHAEL W. GORDON & CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
TRADITIONS 726–27 (1985) (discussing the rejection of the doctrine of separation of 
powers in socialist constitutional theory). 
14 Rhett Ludwikowski, Judicial Review in the Socialist Legal System: Current 
Developments, 37 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 89, 90–91 (1988). 
15 GLENDON, ET AL., supra note 13, at 726–27.  See also RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C. 
BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 226-27 (3d ed. 1985) 
(describing how Marixst-Leninist doctrine rejects the doctrine of the separation of 
powers). 
16 Feofanov, supra note 11, at 628. See also Ludwikowski, supra note 14, at 89-
90 (discussing the Marxist-Leninst jurisprudence’s rejection of the doctrine of 
separation of powers). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/4
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Commission lacked jurisdiction to review enactments by the 
Supreme Soviet or the Congress of People’s Deputies. 
Judicial independence of course presupposes the presence of 
judicial review.  The independence and objectivity of a judge as an 
adjudicator of disputes is meaningless if he does not have the 
power to review such disputes.17  Measurements of judicial 
independence will be discussed in greater detail infra, but for 
present purposes it can be broadly defined as “a judge’s freedom 
to apply her interpretation of the law to each case before her.”18  In 
practice, there was no judicial autonomy from the communist 
Party apparatus, despite provisions in the 1936 and 1977 Soviet 
Constitutions that “[j]udges and people’s assessors are 
independent and subject only to the law.”19  To the contrary, 
“telephone justice,” in which the Party apparatus approved judicial 
opinions prior to their being rendered, was the standard practice.20  
Judges were required to strictly adhere to standard interpretations 
of law and adjudicate cases according to “revolutionary legal 
consciousness.”21  International law was rarely referenced in 
opinions as it was considered a bourgeois interference with the 
creation and maintenance of the communist system.22 
The primacy of the legislature as the supreme expression of the 
people’s will led to the belief that an attempt by the judiciary to 
 
17 See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A 
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 610 (1996) (discussing 
the importance of a court’s legitimacy in answering legal questions). 
18 Thomas E. Plank, The Essential Elements of Judicial Independence and the 
Experience of Pre-Soviet Russia, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 6 (1996). 
19 Konstitutsiia SSSR (1977) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] art. 155.  See 
also Konstitutsiia SSSR (1936) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] art. 112 (“Judges 
are independent and subject only to the law.”).  Similar provisions were found in 
other communist constitutions.  For example in Poland, the Constitution of 1952 
mandated that “[j]udges shall be independent and subject only to the law.” 
CONST. OF THE PEOPLE’S REP. OF POLAND, art. 178(2). 
20 Scott P. Boylan, The Status of Judicial Reform in Russia, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 1327, 1327–28 (1998).  See also Schwartz, Eastern European Courts, supra note 3, 
at 108. 
21 Donald D. Barry, The Quest for Judicial Independence: Soviet Courts in a 
Pravovoe Gosudarstvo, in TOWARD THE “RULE OF LAW” IN RUSSIA? 257, 258 (Donald 
D. Barry ed., 1992).  See also OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE & PETER B. MAGGS, THE SOVIET 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 8 (1987) (discussing the strict adherence to 
the standard interpretation of constitutional principles). 
22 See Pranas Kūris, Implementation of International Human Rights Standards in 
the Lithuanian Legal System and the Problem of the Law-Based State, in TOWARDS THE 
“RULE OF LAW” IN RUSSIA?, supra note 21, at 367, 368 (discussing the concept of a 
law-based state and its relationship to international law and the domestic law). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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interfere with legislative proclamations was necessarily subversive.  
Since the people could not act contrary to their own interests, there 
was no need for judicial institutions to ensure that they did.23  That 
is, the majoritarian nature of the legislature could not be overruled 
by the judiciary in favor of a policy preference advocated by a 
minority.  This would mean that the judiciary had the same 
standing as the legislative bodies of government.  Since this was 
doctrinally denied, the judiciary was relegated to a subordinate 
role within the system.  This invariably led to a general suspicion 
and distrust of the judiciary as a “reactionary bourgeois 
institution.”24 
This general distrust of the judiciary was reflected in its day-to-
day operations.  The classical communist system subordinated the 
judiciary to other branches of government.  Fixed tenure and 
compensation of judges are two key factors which help establish 
and maintain judicial independence.25  However, the Party was 
responsible for judicial appointments and the ministry of justice 
administered the court budget.26  Furthermore, judges were looked 
upon as legal experts with very limited authority, rather than 
participants in the process of government—a symptom of the 
overall lack of legitimacy of the judiciary.27  Thus, the legal system 
as it existed under communism in the USSR lacked the normative 
and institutional foundations associated with a modern judiciary.  
The majoritarian nature of the legislature precluded outside 
review, resulting in no independence of judges to objectively 
adjudicate disputes or examine the constitutionality of legislative 
enactments. 
 
23 Robert F. Utter & David C. Lundsgaard, Comparative Aspects of Judicial 
Review: Issues Facing the New European States, 77 JUDICATURE 240, 242 (1994).  See 
also HAZARD, ET AL., supra note 13, at 32 (“In a system where the legislature is 
conceived to be the supreme expression of the will of all the people . . . how can 
constitutional principles be enforced against a legislature’s will to change them 
through ordinary legislation?”); VYSHINSKY, supra note 13, at 339–40 (contrasting 
the Soviet system with that in the United States); GLENDON, GORDON, & OSAKWE, 
supra note 13, at 726-27. 
24 Utter & Lundsgaard, supra note 23, at 242. 
25 Plank, supra note 18, at 8–9 
26 See Boylan, supra note 20, at 1334. 
27 See Utter & Lundsgaard, supra note 23, at 242 (discussing the reasons for 
and nature of the lack of legitimacy of the judiciary in communist governments).  
See also Christopher Osakwe, The Common Law of Constitutions of Communist Party 
States, 3 REV. SOC. L. 155, 156, 163–73 (1977) (discussing features shared by 
constitutions of the Communist party-states). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/4
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2.2. Judicial Reform and Economic Transition 
Stalin’s 1936 Constitution solidified the legal foundations of the 
communist economic system.  Article 4 of the 1936 USSR 
Constitution provided for the “liquidation of the capitalist system 
of economy” and “the abolition of private ownership of the . . . 
means of production.”28  As the various communist parties of 
Eastern Europe solidified their control over their corresponding 
governments, they placed the means of production under state 
administration.29  Authorities  completed nationalization processes 
relatively quickly after the end of World War II.30  Soviet Union 
Poland, for example, established organizations to administer 
liberated Polish territories prior to the close of World War II.31  
Authorities implemented the Nationalization Law by the 
beginning of 1946 and mandated that all enterprises employing 
fifty or more workers were to be under state control.32  The process 
culminated with the state economic planning authorities 
controlling 90 percent of all enterprises by the end of 1947.33  
Czechoslovakia followed a similar pattern.  The Soviets sought to 
nationalize all enterprises administered by the Nazis and assumed 
control over economic activity by the end of the 1940s.34 
 
28 Konstitutsiia SSSR (1936) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] art. 4. 
29 IVAN T. BEREND, CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 1944-1993: DETOUR FROM THE 
PERIPHERY TO THE PERIPHERY 73 (1996).  The vast majority of industries were 
nationalized by the various Soviet satellites by 1946.  For example, the state 
controlled approximately 89 percent of the Albanian economy by the end of 1946.  
Id.  Similarly the Yugoslav government administered approximately 82 percent of 
the economy during the same period.  Id.  Likewise, 80 percent of the economies 
of Poland and Czechoslovakia were directed and owned by the state.  Id. 
30 Id. at 73.  By the end of 1948 the vast majority of Czechoslovak firms 
employing more than fifty people were owned and administered by the State.  Id.  
In Poland, state-owned enterprises accounted for approximately 97 percept of 
economic output.  Id.  By the end of the decade the overwhelming majority of both 
the Romanian and Bulgarian economies were administered by the state.  Id. 
31 See 2 NORMAN DAVIES, GOD’S PLAYGROUND: A HISTORY OF POLAND 413 
(1982) (demonstrating how two separate Communist organizations existed; one in 
occupied Poland and one in the Soviet Union); JAN B. DE WEYDENTHAL, THE 
COMMUNISTS OF POLAND: AN HISTORICAL OUTLINE 44–45 (1978) (explaining the shift 
to active struggle by the Peasant Movement in the run up to World War II in 
Poland). 
32 DAVIES, supra note 31, at 426. 
33 Id. 
34 See JOSEF KALVODA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA’S ROLE IN SOVIET STRATEGY 180 (1978) 
(explaining that Czechoslovakia’s move into the Soviet orbit included the 
Communist takeover of economic enterprises that had been under German 
control). 
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Various bureaus of the Communist Party controlled all the 
rights associated with private property—alienation, control, and 
residual income.  The right of alienation of property is the ability of 
an owner to transfer, bequeath, or otherwise transfer property 
without hindrance.  In U.S. common law there has traditionally 
been a presumption against restraining alienation.35  However in 
the classical communist legal-economic system, the right of 
alienation cannot be exercised by anyone, including the state.  
State-owned firms were not tangible objects in the eyes of the state 
and could not be bought or sold as such.36  Furthermore, the 
classical communist system mandated that the residual income 
from state-owned firms flow back into the coffers of the state 
budget.37  That is to say there was no notion of profit in the sense 
used in market economies.  Rather, the state bureaucracy 
determined the contribution of each firm’s gross revenue paid to 
the state as “centralized net income.”38  The state bureaucracy also 
exercised control over the firm and its activities.  The financial 
affairs of the firm were organizationally separate from the matters 
of bureaucratic control.39  This “ownership” paradigm had the 
effect of depersonalizing property; there was no individual entity 
that could be identified as the owner of property as there was a 
complete separation from notions of control and ownership.40 
 
35 The Supreme Court of Washington stated concisely that: 
The great weight of authority is that where the fee simple title to real 
estate passes under a deed or will, any restraint attempted to be imposed 
by the instrument upon the grantee or devisee is to be treated as void, 
and the grantee or devisee takes the property free of the void condition. 
Richardson v. Danson, 270 P.2d 802, 807 (Wash. 1954); see also R.H. Macy & Co. v. 
May Dep’t Stores Co., 653 A.2d 461 (Md. 1995) (holding a restraint on alienation of 
a fee simple interest void and unenforceable); Horse Pond Fish & Game Club, Inc. 
v. Cormier, 581 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1990) (requiring that a direct restraint on 
alienation be reasonable in light of the parties’ interests); N.W. Real Estate Co. v. 
Serio, 144 A. 245 (Md. 1929) (invalidating a grantor consent clause as an 
unreasonable restraint on alienation of a fee simple conveyance); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS introductory note at 143 (1983)  (“Much 
of modern property law operates on the assumption that freedom to alienate 
property interests which one may own is essential to the welfare of society.”). 
36 JÁNOS KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
COMMUNISM 74 (1992). 
37 Id. at 73. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 74–75. 
40 Id. at 75. 
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Of course some nations in Central and Eastern Europe deviated 
from the classical socialist model of economics and property rights.  
For instance, beginning in January 1968, Hungary implemented the 
New Economic Mechanism, a series of economic reforms which 
incorporated market information into the state planning 
apparatus.41  Authorities incorporated “auxiliary enterprises” into 
the Hungarian economy that functioned independent of direct 
state control.42  They recognized various “intermediate property 
forms” and created financial intermediaries to provide funding for 
joint ventures.43 
The creation of private property, the owner’s secure right 
thereof, and the transfer of state-owned assets was a principle 
component of the economic reform because it serves as the 
foundation of a functioning market economy.  An effective judicial 
system is essential to the establishment and protection of private 
property.  The inadequate protection of property rights leads to 
lower investment rates and slower economic growth.44  Moreover, 
firms that operate in a legal environment that is effectively able to 
guarantee property rights have comparably higher reinvestment 
 
41 See ANDREW FELKAY, HUNGARY AND THE USSR 1956-1988: KADAR’S POLITICAL 
LEADERSHIP 183, 189–90 (1989).  By 1965 Hungary was trading extensively with 
non-CMEA members and in 1982 became a member of the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank.  Id. at 254–55. 
42 Id. at 81.  Auxiliary enterprises were not governed by the same rules as 
industries but rather as part as collectives.  Id.  Examples of such enterprises are 
food processing, furniture making quarries, and lumber.  Id.  “Family work 
organizations”—family-oriented private enterprises—were also permitted to 
operate outside of state control.  Id. at 181-82.  In the first year of the reform 
approximately 11,000 new private companies were formed.  The 1980 Party 
Congress declared that: 
During their spare time, a certain percentage of the workers participate 
in work that is useful to the national economy and to the individual.  
This is a supplementary source of our development that contributes to 
satisfying ever-widening and changing demands and at the same time 
enhances the growth of the nation’s wealth. 
Id. at 252. 
43 Id. at 184. 
44 Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross 
Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207, 210 
(1995); Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing 
Property Rights, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 87, 102 (1996) (“The absence of well-defined and 
secure property rights . . . clearly contributes to a slower rate of transition.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
 
216 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:1 
rates.45  Thus, the judicial protection of property rights is necessary 
for economic growth. 
Well-functioning judicial institutions are also necessary for the 
creation and development of capital markets.  Sound and effective 
investor protection provided by courts raises the willingness of 
consumers to purchase securities by decreasing the probability that 
such investment will be expropriated in some way.  Effective 
judicial institutions therefore increase the demand for securities, 
raise investment, increase the size of capital markets, and further 
growth.46  Thus, judicial reform has significant implications for the 
economic transition in Eastern Europe. 
The creation of sound legal institutions, however, does not 
occur spontaneously; there is no proverbial magic button that is 
pushed as a constitution is drafted to guarantee private property 
and investor protections.  Rather, laws are written, often at the 
commencement of economic and political transition, and 
implemented over time.  Technocrats learn, experiment, and repeat 
based on experiences at both individual and collective levels.47  
Moreover, law-based economic protections do not exist in a 
vacuum—they also exist in a sociopolitical environment.  
Pressures, both external and internal to government, influence how 
 
45 Simon Johnson, John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Property Rights 
and Finance, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1335, 1354 (2002) (finding that the reinvestment 
rate for private firms operating in an environment with secure property rates is 56 
percent compared to 32 percent for firms which operate in an insecure legal 
environment). 
46 See Feld & Voigt, supra note 6, at 516 (concluding that de facto judicial 
independence positively influences real GDP growth on a per capita basis); La 
Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 6, at 1149 (finding a strong legal 
environment, through legal rules and their enforcement, has the effect of 
expanding capital markets); Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and 
Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 537, 537 (1998) (finding stock market liquidity 
and banking development are positively correlated with economic growth); 
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. 
ECON. REV. 559, 559 (1998) (discussing the positive relationship between financial-
sector development and economic growth). 
47 See, e.g., Mark Dodgson, Organizational Learning: A Review of Some 
Literatures, 14 ORG. STUD. 375 (1993) (discussing the value in synthesizing different 
approaches to create an interdisciplinary perspective to study organizational 
learning); Daniel H. Kim, The Link Between Individual and Organizational Learning, 
SLOAN MGMT. REV., Fall 1993, at 37 (presenting a framework to explain the process 
through which individual learning advances institutional learning); C. 
Mantzavinos, Douglass C. North & Syed Shariq, Learning, Institutions, and 
Economic Performance, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 75 (2004) (exploring the link between 
individual and collective learning and overall economic performance). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/4
 
2009] TOWARD AN INTERPRETIVE MODEL  217 
law operates.  Any understanding of judicial reform in Eastern 
Europe must account for law as it evolves, and, more specifically, 
how a legal tribunal can assert independent authority to adjudicate 
claims in an environment where such a norm has been absent. 
2.3. Judicial Reform and Democratic Consolidation 
Similar to research on the economic transitions in Eastern 
Europe, studies of democratization and democratic consolidation 
have not adequately explored how judicial independence and 
legitimacy are established over time by the courts.  A multitude of 
studies, however, have included judicial independence in their 
discussion of general factors that lead to democratization and its 
consolidation in Eastern Europe. 
There is, however, no consensus on precisely what democratic 
consolidation entails, when it is achieved, or what causes it to 
occur.  At a minimum, political scientists have viewed democratic 
consolidation as a free democratic process (i.e. free elections).48  
Others have seen it more comprehensively as a system of “inter-
related arenas”:  the presence of a civil society, political society, 
economic society, state bureaucracy, and the rule of law.49  One 
author described the essence of democratic consolidation as 
leaving those political actors not engaged in democratic 
rulemaking out of “the only game in town.”50 
To complicate matters, there is significant disagreement as to 
how this vague concept of democracy takes hold in a country after 
a democratic transition.  Some studies have looked to various 
 
48 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 250 
(3rd ed. 1950) (“[T]he democratic method is that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the 
people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble 
in order to carry out its will.”). 
49 See JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST 
EUROPE 7–15 (1996) (identifying the five major arenas of a consolidated democracy 
as civil society, political society, rule of law, state apparatus, and economic 
society).  Robert Dahl has also viewed democracy and the process of 
democratization in a broader sociological context.  ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY 
AND ITS CRITICS 233 (1989) (discussing the extent to which governments vary in 
sustaining the democratic processes and institutions necessary for polyarchy).  See 
also ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY 1–33 (1971) (examining the significance of 
polyarchy and the conditions that increase the chances of democratization); 
ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 84–87 (1956) (discussing the 
definitional characteristics, measurement, and preconditions for polyarchy). 
50 GIUSEPPE DI PALMA, TO CRAFT DEMOCRACIES 113 (1990). 
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preconditions, such as levels of economic development, as 
important variables in explaining successful transitions to 
democracy.51  Others have viewed democratization as something 
that might be crafted or engineered by political actors.  Proponents 
of this perspective emphasize the role of power balances between 
the opposition and the ancien régime,52 or among elites.53 
Another body of literature discussing democratization and its 
consolidation focuses on the role of institutions.54  Much of this 
focus, however, has centered on executive-legislative relationships, 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of presidential and 
parliamentary systems, and how these systems have come into 
being.55 
There seems to be an emerging consensus that an independent 
judiciary as a guardian of the rule of law is a vital component of 
both the transition to and the consolidation of democracy.56  Many 
studies have highlighted the crucial role of an independent 
 
51 See Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 
AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994) (noting that economic development can help ensure 
political stability). 
52 See Michael McFaul, The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: 
Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, 54 WORLD POL. 212 (2002) 
(examining the different causal paths that account for post-communist regime 
changes). 
53 See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE 
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 109–64 (1991) (examining democratic transitions during 
the 1970s and 1980s and discussing the role of political elites in bringing about 
these transitions); John Higley & Michael G. Burton, The Elite Variable in 
Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 17, 17 (1989) (discussing 
the link between “consensually unified” elites and stable democratic regimes); 
Dankwart A. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, 2 COMP. 
POL. 337 (1970) (arguing that the process of democratization begins through a 
political struggle started by the emergence of a new elite rousing a leaderless 
group into action). 
54 See, e.g., JON ELSTER, CLAUS OFFE & ULRICH K. PREUSS, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: REBUILDING THE SHIP AT SEA (1998). 
55 See, e.g., Gerald. M. Easter, Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist 
Regime Change in Russia and the NIS, 49 WORLD POL. 184 (1997); Donald L. 
Horowitz, Presidents vs. Parliaments: Comparing Democratic Systems, 1 J. OF 
DEMOCRACY 73 (1990); G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: 
Participation, Stability, and Violence, in PARLIAMENTARY VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL 
GOVERNMENT 223 (Arend Lijphart ed., 1992); Alfred Stepan & Cindy Skach, 
Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus 
Presidentialism, 46 WORLD POL. 1 (1993). 
56 LINZ & STEPAN, supra note 49, at 248.  In the authors’ view of democratic 
consolidation, the rule of law is part of one of five “interlocking arenas” of which 
an independent judiciary is a principle component.  Id.  
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judiciary capable of reviewing executive and legislative decisions 
as a prerequisite for the creation of a Rechtsstaat or “state of law.”57  
A Rechtsstaat occurs when citizens are able to effectively assert 
their political and civil rights against encroachments by the state, 
thereby limiting the state’s executive and legislative discretionary 
power. 
Furthermore, an independent judiciary with the power to 
review government decisions helps lead to a “constitutional 
culture” whereby state and non-state actors learn that the legal 
bounds of the system cannot be transgressed.58 This is particularly 
important in the post-communist countries considering that the 
judiciary was previously viewed with hostility and systematically 
subordinated to the prerogatives of the legislative and executive 
components of government.  In short, a judiciary capable of 
independent objective review is the “institutional mechanism to 
safeguard the rule of law.”59 
While much of the scholarly work emphasizes the importance 
of judicial reform, it does not articulate how to achieve this reform.  
The question remains whether the key to judicial reform lies in the 
way judicial institutions are established or the way judicial 
institutions operate.  Moreover, how does international law affect 
the way a domestic court can shape the new liberal social 
dynamics of the state? 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF JUDICIAL REFORM 
The principle aim of this Article is to examine the role of 
international law in the judicial transition of CEE countries against 
the formal structure of the judiciary.  In order to successfully do so, 
the case law of the sample countries must be analyzed against the 
formal structure of the legal system.  Lithuania and Estonia serve 
 
57 See Mark F. Brzezinski & Leszek Garlicki, Judicial Review in Post-Communist 
Poland: The Emergence of a Rechtsstaat?, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 13, 14 (1995) (discussing 
Poland’s Rechtsstaat clause and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s use of it to 
curb legislative and bureaucratic arbitrariness in the post-Communist era); Juan J. 
Linz & Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, 7 J. OF DEMOCRACY 14, 18 
(1996) (discussing how modern forms of Rechtsstaat are fundamental in making 
democratization possible). 
58 See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A 
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 606 (1996) (explaining 
that the institutionalization of the rule of law notifies political actors that the 
bounds of the legal system cannot be transgressed for partisan political purposes). 
59 Id. at 625. 
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as ideal case studies for such a comparative study.  First, both 
countries were part of the Soviet Union, and thus shared similar 
normative experiences under communism before facing similar 
tasks of judicial reform when transition commenced.  Lithuania 
and Estonia gained independence from the Soviet Union at the 
same time.  Second, both applied for European Union (“EU”) and 
Council of Europe (“CoE”) membership around the same time.  It 
is important to note that Lithuania and Estonia are located in 
similar geopolitical positions in Europe, and thus the difference in 
pressure from international organizations such as the EU and CoE 
resulting from different geostrategic positions is likely to be 
negligible.  Third, both countries have a monist approach to 
incorporating international law into their domestic legal regimes. 
In short, the variability between the normative, geographic, 
and historical factors of Lithuania and Estonia is comparatively 
minimal.  However, Lithuania and Estonia adopted dissimilar 
systems of judicial review.  Lithuania opted for the Austrian 
“centralized” judicial system, including its corresponding 
institutions, standing requirements, and model of judicial review.  
Estonia conversely chose a more “diffuse” model of judicial review 
grounded in the American tradition of jurisprudence.  Thus, these 
two countries provide for an optimal case comparison as we can 
control for systemic factors between the two countries and then 
look to patterns in their judicial reasoning to reach conclusions 
about how the formal structure of the judiciary affects a court’s 
reasoning. 
For reasons previously discussed, judicial independence in a 
transition country can be observed when a court rules against an 
issue with popular or governmental support, i.e. 
countermajoritarian issues.60  Thus, an analysis of such cases can 
reveal the actual way in which independence was asserted.  When 
the legal reasoning in opinions from two different legal systems—
one in the Austrian model and the other in the American—are 
compared, the significance of the judicial review system can be 
ascertained.  The case law of Estonia and Lithuania will be 
examined for patterns of legal reasoning.  The following outlines 
the theoretical foundations of judicial review, as well as the post-
independent political context in which they take place. 
 
60 See supra Section 2.1. 
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A stark pattern emerges from an analysis of the case law from 
Estonia and Lithuania.  Both countries, notwithstanding the 
systemic differences in the composition of their respective 
judiciaries, look to international law as a component of their legal 
reasoning.  Thus, in establishing their independence vis-à-vis 
political pressures from the other institutions of government and 
wider populations, the national courts utilized international law as 
an external source of legitimacy.  This “external source legitimacy” 
permitted the national court system to establish itself as a 
legitimate institution with respect to the popularly elected 
institutions of government. 
This is paramount as there was no pre-existing normative 
frame by which judicial institutions were popularly perceived as a 
naturally legitimate component of government.  Indeed, policy 
outcomes are seen as legitimate “to the extent they receive 
reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by 
all those subject to the decision in question.”61  Therefore, in 
essence, a legitimacy gap transpired at the outset of transition, 
which made the CEE judiciaries highly susceptible to political 
pressure.  By relying on external source legitimacy, the post-
independence Constitutional and Supreme Courts were able to fill 
that legitimacy gap and establish themselves as independent legal 
arbiters. 
3.1. Models of Judicial Review 
Judicial institutions created during the process of constitution 
drafting could be modeled in the tradition of one of the two 
alternative legal systems: the American or Austrian models.62  
None of the CEE countries, except Estonia, opted for the American 
system of judicial review.63  The American model places the 
Supreme Court as the highest appellate court.  The system is 
“diffuse” in that lower courts have the jurisdiction to declare acts 
of government unconstitutional.64  Courts can only “concretely” 
 
61 John S. Dryzek, Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy, 29 POL. 
THEORY 651, 651 (2001). 
62 Erhard Blankenburg, Changes in Political Regimes and Continuity of the Rule 
of Law in Germany, in COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 249, 
308 (Herbert Jacob et al. eds., 1996). 
63 Schwartz, Eastern European Courts, supra note 3, at 100–101. 
64 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional 
Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117, 121 (2001). 
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review a dispute that contains an actual case or controversy at 
issue.65  Additionally, only ex post review is exercised, meaning 
that an act must have been passed before a court can consider its 
constitutionality.66  Lastly, parties must comply with the complex 
set of standing requirements in order to question the 
constitutionality of an act.67 
In contrast, the Hans Kelsen-inspired Austrian system of 
judicial review vests the responsibility of constitutional review of 
legislative acts and executive degrees in a constitutional court.68  
The constitutional court is a specialized tribunal, distinct from the 
rest of the judiciary, and the only judicial body with jurisdiction to 
assess the constitutionality of government acts.69  In this sense, the 
system is “centralized” because the regular judiciary does not 
possess the ability to determine the constitutionality of legislative 
enactments.  Usually, a lower court is required to refer a 
constitutional question to the constitutional court prior to 
concluding a proceeding. 
The Austrian system also vests constitutional courts with the 
authority to engage in ex ante review, allowing them to examine 
the constitutionality of a government’s policy prior to its 
effectuation.  Moreover, a constitutional court may usually engage 
in “abstract” judicial review.70  This type of judicial review occurs 
when certain political actors or citizens have the right to challenge 
the constitutionality of legislation in the absence of an actual 
controversy.71  Thus, the right to examine the constitutionality of 
legislative enactments exists as a general governing principle.72  
Finally, standing requirements in the Austrian system are less 
rigorous and grant a multitude of actors—from politicians to 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 See Herman Schwartz, The New Eastern European Constitutional Courts, 13 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 741, 744 (1992) (“As opposed to the American ‘diffuse system,’ 
Europeans concentrate the power to review the constitutionality of legislation in 
one special tribunal which is not part of the ordinary judiciary and does not 
adjudicate conventional litigation . . . .”). 
69 See Torbjörn Vallinder, When the Courts Go Marching In, in THE GLOBAL 
EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 13 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1995). 
70 Georg Vanberg, Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy 
Compromise, 10 J. THEORETICAL POL. 299, 301 (1998). 
71 Id. at 300. 
72 Leonas Sabaliūnas, Comparative Perspectives on Judicial Review in Lithuania, 
48 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 783, 787 (1996). 
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ordinary citizens73—the ability to challenge the constitutionality of 
a law before the tribunal.  This is in sharp contrast to the American 
model of jurisprudence, which does not allow members of 
Congress to initiate a challenge to the constitutionality of a law.  
Under the Austrian model, relaxed standing requirements allow, 
and even encourage, such challenges. 
3.2. Systemic Effects on Democratization and Consolidation 
Much of the scholarship on the role of the judiciary in 
democratization centers on the institutional design of the legal 
system.  The vast majority of legal systems in CEE have adopted 
the Austrian-Kelsen model of judicial review as well as its central 
 
73 Germany, Hungary, and Russia grant private individuals access to their 
respective constitutional courts.  In Germany, for instance, any person may file a 
constitutional complaint (“Verfassungsbeschwerde”) alleging that a violation of a 
constitutional right occurred.  See Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
[GG] [Constitution] art. 93(1) (4a) (F.R.G.) (stating that “[t]he Federal 
Constitutional Court shall rule . . . on constitutional complaints, which may be 
filed by any person alleging that one of his basic rights. . . has been infringed by 
public authority.”); Gesetz über das Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfgGG] [Law on 
the Federal Constitutional Court], Dec. 12, 1951, BGBl. I at 243, amended by Act of 
16 July 1998, BGBl. I at 1823, art. 13(8a) (providing that “The Federal 
Constitutional Court shall decide in the cases determined by the Basic Law, to wit 
8a. on constitutional complaints”).  Article 90 of the BVerfGG also provides that: 
(1) Any person who claims that one of his basic rights or one of his rights 
under Articles 20 (4), 33, 38, 101, 103 and 104 of the Basic Law has been 
violated by public authority may lodge a constitutional complaint with 
the Federal Constitutional Court. 
(2) If legal action against the violation is admissible, the constitutional 
complaint may not be lodged until all remedies have been exhausted. 
However, the Federal Constitutional Court may decide immediately on a 
constitutional complaint lodged before all remedies have been exhausted 
if it is of general relevance or if recourse to other courts first would entail 
a serious and unavoidable disadvantage for the complainant. 
(3) The right to lodge a constitutional complaint with the constitutional 
court of the Land in accordance with the provisions of the Land 
constitution shall remain unaffected. 
Id. art 90(1)–(3).  See also A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [Constitution] art. 
32b (Hung.) (outlining the jurisdiction of the The Parliamentary Ombudsman for 
Civil Rights and the Parliamentary Ombudsman for the Rights of National and 
Ethnic Minorities); Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [KONST. RF.] [Constitution] 
art. 125(4) (1993) (Russ.) (“The Constitution Court of the Russian Federation, upon 
complaints about violations of constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens and 
upon court requests shall check, according to the rules fixed by the federal law, 
the constitutional of a law applied or subject to be applied in a concrete case.”). 
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institution: the constitutional court.  This can be attributed, in part, 
to the pervasive suspicion of judges during the communist 
period.74  The awesome power to declare legislative acts invalid 
was not entrusted to normal judges.75  The preponderance of 
constitutional courts in the countries that emerged from 
communism was also due to unfamiliarity with American-style 
jurisprudence.  Professor Jon Elster argues that constitutional 
courts in the Austrian tradition are a vital component of 
democratization and democratic consolidation, especially in 
fragmented societies where a neutral arbiter of disputes fosters 
ideas of constitutional supremacy and judicial depolitization.76  
Others have asserted that the importance of constitutional courts in 
post-communist transition lies in the nature of the political 
transition.77  The principal risk to individual liberties is from 
administrative agencies and “pliant” legislatures, which can 
violate rights while maintaining the semblance of democratic 
legitimacy.  It is argued that a constitutional court, as a neutral 
legal arbiter formally insulated from political pressure, is a better 
protector of individual liberties and the fairness of the political 
process than the regular judiciary. 
Therefore, the Austrian model was viewed as the best available 
vehicle for institutionalizing judicial independence.  The absence of 
judicial independence under communist rule required going 
beyond formal guarantees of autonomy regarding the regular 
judiciary—recall that Article 112 of the 1936 USSR Constitution 
mandated judicial independence.78  A constitutional tribunal, on 
the other hand, insulated the court from pressures from other 
government actors.  This view was supported by Helmut 
Steinberger’s Council of Europe study in which he stated: 
 
74 See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (discussing that communist-
era judges were required to adhere to standard legal interpretations and 
discouraged from citing international law precedent). 
75 See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-
COMMUNIST EUROPE 22 (2000) (explaining that, because of the entrenched distrust 
of ordinary judges as policy makers, ex-Communist countries only authorized 
special tribunals to annul legislation). 
76 ELSTER ET AL., supra note 54. 
77 See generally, Schwartz, Eastern European Courts, supra note 3, at 110 
(providing specific examples of the role of constitutional courts in Eastern Europe 
in the 1990s). 
78 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing how there was no 
judicial autonomy in practice despite provisions for judicial independence in the 
Soviet Constitution). 
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Especially if a state wishes to introduce constitutional 
jurisdiction to its legal system, for the first time, possibly in 
connection with a new constitution, it appears preferable to 
entrust the decision of constitutional issues to a special 
institution, raised (to that extent) above the ordinary courts.  
For in this situation the judges of the ordinary courts may 
be neither trained nor used to dealing with constitutional 
matters.79 
Additionally, some argue that the relaxed standing 
requirement of the Austrian system encourages multiple actors to 
file challenges regarding an act’s constitutionality, including 
members of the legislative assemblies.80  This, in turn, has an 
“anticipatory effect” of giving the parliamentary majority the 
incentive to consider minority interests during the legislative 
process.81  Logically, a radical policy would inevitably bring a 
constitutional challenge from the opposition.  The Austrian system 
thus encourages policy compromise and legislative bargaining, 
which might otherwise be absent. 
Alternatively, some scholars posit that judicial institutions 
further democratic consolidation by “channeling” legislative 
programs along paths of internationally defined reforms because 
the courts can translate international norms into concrete 
constitutional arguments.82  Moreover, the model argues that 
judicial legitimacy can be created because the courts can effectively 
link the legitimacy of international law and domestic law through 
legal reasoning.  In other words, judicial independence lies in the 
de facto operation of the court system rather than its formal 
structure.  Courts can best fulfill this role when three conditions 
are present:  (1) the presence of international constraints, (2) 
 
79 HELMUT STEINBERGER, MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION 3 (1993). 
80 See Schwartz, Eastern European Courts, supra note 3, at 102 (noting that all 
European constitutions encourage constitutional challenges by legislators). 
81 See Georg Vanberg, Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy 
Compromise, 10 J. THEORETICAL POL. 299, 300 (1998) (observing that a system of 
abstract review encourages majority groups to weigh opposition interests when 
drafting legislation). 
82 See Maveety & Grosskopf, supra note 8, at 464 (asserting courts can 
facilitate democratic consolidation through constitutional adjudication that 
channels legislative initiatives down particular paths and reconstitutes the context 
in which democratic decision making takes place). 
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conflicts between majority and minority interests, (3) and the 
explicit incorporation of international law into domestic law.83 
3.3. Measuring Judicial Independence 
As discussed, judicial review is necessary for an independent 
judiciary to exist.84  Once the judiciary obtains the jurisdiction to 
review acts of government, the analysis shifts to measure how such 
review is exercised.  That is, how independent is the judiciary in 
practice once it has received the power to adjudicate disputes?  The 
literature examining judicial independence, in both economic and 
political contexts, primarily concentrates on the formal, or de jure, 
requirements of judicial impartiality.  It considers factors including 
fixed tenure and compensation for judges, the presence of 
minimum qualifications for judicial officials, and the extent of 
judicial immunity.85  Other studies have looked to judicial 
independence by examining the finality of judicial decisions, the 
type of judicial review, judges’ term lengths, the requirements for 
removal, and formal court procedures.86  There is a similar pattern 
of such measurements in the economic literature discussed above.87 
However, certain studies have concluded that “court behavior 
often responds to factors unrelated to its constitutionally defined 
authority.”88  These studies have further found that the formal 
provisions guaranteeing an independent judiciary were “not 
related significantly” to the way judicial review was exercised in 
practice.89  Thus, measuring judicial independence by considering 
only the formal guarantees of judicial autonomy without 
 
83 See id. at 467–68 (suggesting three contextual attributes of the democratic 
consolidation process that allow a court to channel legislative initiatives). 
84 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
85 See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Essential Elements of Judicial Independence 
and the Experience of Pre-Soviet Russia, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1996) (arguing 
that these institutional arrangements are necessary for the existence of judicial 
independence). 
86 See generally Shannon Ishiyama Smithey & John Ishiyama, Judicious Choices: 
Designing Courts in Post-Communist Politics, 33 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST 
STUD. 163 (2000) (identifying six components that measure judicial power). 
87 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
88 Erik S. Herron & Kirk A. Randazzo, The Relationship Between Independence 
and Judicial Review in Post-Communist Courts, 65 J. POL. 422, 435 (2003). 
89 Id. at 432. 
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considering judicial interpretation is insufficient for a complete 
analysis.90 
Communist doctrine placed the legislative bodies at the center 
of government structure, as the expression of the voice of the 
proletariat.91  The majoritarian nature of legislative acts trumped 
the power of the judiciary, thereby denying judicial review and 
independence.92  Given that the judiciary was formally granted 
jurisdiction to review decisions in the post-communist era, the 
logical place to examine the exercise of such jurisdiction is 
instances in which courts have ruled against governments with 
widespread popular support.  Thus, judicial independence can be 
effectively examined in the post-communist context in cases where 
the courts have been expressly countermajoritarian.93 
This notion, as reflected by studies on judicial independence, is 
generally defined as follows: 
(a) the degree to which judges believe they can decide and 
do decide consistent with their own personal attitudes, 
values, and conceptions of judicial role (in their 
interpretation of the law), (b) in opposition to what others, 
who have or are believed to have political or judicial power, 
think about or desire in like matters, and (c) particularly 
when a decision adverse to the beliefs or desires of those 
 
90 See generally Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin 
America, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (“[F]ormal constitutional 
guarantees of judicial independence have been largely ineffective in much of Latin 
America because of certain structural features of Latin American politics and legal 
institutions.”). 
91 See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text. 
92 See supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text. 
93 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (explaining that judicial review is a 
countermajoritarian force).  Other scholars have identified the same notion with 
different language.  Robert Dahl referred to the “majority criterion” as a court’s 
decision to protect “minorities against tyranny by majorities.”  Robert A. Dahl, 
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. 
PUB. L. 279, 281−82 (1957).  See also Sarah Wright Sheive, Central and Eastern 
European Constitutional Courts and the Antimajoritarian Objection to Judicial Review, 
26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1201, 1216 (1995) (arguing that European constitutional 
courts’ “abstract review of parliamentary legislation” is a powerful example of 
“antimajoritarian objection”). 
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with political or judicial power may bring some retribution 
on the judges personally or on the power of the court.94 
Several studies have generally followed the 
countermajoritarian approach to measuring judicial independence.  
Professor Owen Fiss, for instance, looked to the “political 
insularity” of the judiciary—that is the extent to which the 
judiciary is independent from the influence of political actors and 
public opinion.95  Other studies have similarly argued that in 
addition to formal guarantees, measures of judicial independence 
should also include the extent to which the judiciary is perceived 
as legitimate, and its functional operation.96  Indeed, several 
studies that analyze how constitutional courts foster the protection 
of individual liberties assume that the judiciary is insulated from 
the other branches of government.97  This implies that a court is 
independent to the extent that it rules against other branches of 
government—in other words, countermajoritarian decisions. 
3.4. International and European Law 
3.4.1. The Relationship between International and Domestic Law 
Marxist ideology viewed international law as bourgeois and 
accordingly restricted its influence in domestic jurisprudence.98  
 
94 THEODORE L. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL 
FUNCTIONINGS OF COURTS 144 (1970). 
95 Owen M. Fiss, The Limits of Judicial Independence, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. 
REV. 57, 59−60 (1993).  Epstein et al., examines judicial independence as a function 
of the “tolerance interval[]” of other branches of government to the policy and 
political ramifications of judicial decisions.  Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga 
Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of 
Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117, 131 (2001). 
96 See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A 
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 610 (1996) (arguing that 
“the extent to which [courts] are collectively seen as a legitimate body for the 
determination of right, wrong, legal, and illegal” should be incorporated in the 
definition of judicial independence) (emphasis omitted); Sheive, supra note 93, at 
1225 (arguing that democracy may be diminished in the public’s mind when 
constitutional courts have broad power to review parliamentary legislation). 
97 See Schwartz, Eastern European Courts, supra note 3, at 111 (“Without an 
institution free from the timidity and stifling judicial deference to legislative 
supremacy that are still common among the general run of the judiciary in most 
East European countries, too many dubious laws and official actions would 
remain unchallenged.”). 
98 Kūris, supra note 22, at 368. 
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Moreover, none of the Warsaw Pact members regulated the 
relationship between international law and domestic law through 
constitutional provisions, leading to variant constructions of the 
force of international law among the communist countries.99  
Independence and the framing of new constitutional orders 
provided the opportunity for the countries under the former 
sphere of Soviet influence to re-evaluate and clarify the 
relationship between domestic and international law. 
There are two general approaches of transposing international 
law into domestic jurisprudence.  Under a “dualist” approach, 
international treaties are considered by courts as distinct from 
domestic law, typically requiring an act of transformation by 
parliament to render such agreements enforceable in the domestic 
courts.100  Alternatively, states can opt for a “monist” system 
whereby international treaties are automatically considered part of 
domestic law.101  This allows domestic courts to apply the 
principles and norms of international law without an additional act 
from the government.102 
Some commentators have posited that, jurisprudentially, the 
independence of a state, in and of itself, subjects that state to the 
bounds of international law.103  Indeed, this “independent nation 
thesis” even found support in early U.S. Supreme Court opinions 
and writings supporting the ratification of the United States 
Constitution.  An early American case regarding the repayment of 
 
99 See Eric Stein, International Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of 
Central-Eastern European Constitutions?, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 427, 432 (1994) (noting 
the dearth of constitutional provisions or legislation to regulate the effect of 
international law). 
100 John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy 
Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 314–15 (1992). 
 101 Konstantin Korkelia, New Trends Regarding the Relationship Between 
International and National Law (With a Special View Towards the States of Eastern 
Europe), 23 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 227, 228 (1997). 
102 Id.   
103 See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. 
REV. 1555, 1556 (1984) (“An entity that becomes a State in the international system 
is ipso facto subject to international law.”).  See also Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of 
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM J. INT’L L. 740, 743 
(1939) (stating that the duty to apply international law in federal courts is one 
imposed upon “the United States as an international person”); Lord Blackstone 
also alluded to the status of customary international law as enforceable in 
domestic courts.  International law was viewed as “a system of rules, deducible by 
natural reason, and established by universal consent among the civilized 
inhabitants of the world. . . .” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66. 
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pre-Revolutionary War debts owed to British subjects led the 
Supreme Court to proclaim that “[w]hen the United States 
declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of 
nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement.  By every 
nation, whatever is its form of government, the confiscation of 
debts has long been considered disreputable . . . .”104 
The new constitutions of CEE countries demonstrate a “clear 
tendency towards ‘de jure recognition’ of the primacy of 
international law . . . .”105  There are important implications of this 
trend for democratization and democratic consolidation.  First, the 
monist approach of incorporating international treaties into 
domestic law places primacy on international human rights norms.  
Judicial protection of individual liberties grounded in international 
law is more resolute when such international treaties are deemed 
to take precedence over domestic legislation.  Second, a monist 
system gives courts the authority to reference international 
principles and norms, and allows courts to link their own 
legitimacy with that of the international treaty.106  As such, the 
method of incorporating international treaties into domestic laws is 
paramount.  Generally, the constitutions of Central and Eastern 
Europe explicitly provide that international law is directly 
applicable by domestic courts, thereby allowing courts to serve as 
conduits of democratic consolidation. 
3.4.2. The European Union and Council of Europe 
The collapse of the USSR, the emergence of a unipolar world 
order, and the presence of the European Union all distinguish the 
Central and Eastern European economic and political transitions.  
A principle objective of the post-communist states was a successful 
accession to the European Union.  A successful application for 
membership required meeting the Copenhagen Criteria, part of 
 
104 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J., writing seriatim) 
(emphasis omitted).  See also James T. Gathii, The American Origins of Liberal and 
Illiberal Regimes of International Economic Governance in the Marshall Court, 54 BUFF. 
L. REV. 765, 776–79 (2006) (discussing the background of Ware v. Hylton).  For a 
learned commentary on the examination by American courts of international legal 
sources see David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA 
L. REV. 539 (2001). 
105 Vladlen S. Vereshchetin, New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the 
Relationship Between International Law and National Law, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 29, 29 
(1996). 
106 Maveety & Grosskopf, supra note 8, at 467. 
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which provides that membership is contingent upon the “stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities . . . .”107  
Furthermore, successful accession depends upon a candidate 
country adopting the Acquis Communautaire of the European 
Union—the entire 80,000 pages of statutes, regulations, and 
opinions promulgated by the EU.108  The progress of candidate 
countries was (and is) monitored by the EU, which delivered 
yearly regular reports regarding various aspects of the transition. 
Indeed, the conditionality of EU membership creates its own 
dynamics both internal and external to the state.  Such 
conditionality works through a commitment-device mechanism 
arising out of the power asymmetry between the EU and candidate 
countries.109  The governments of candidate countries are less likely 
to postpone difficult compliance policies for short-term political 
gains.110  EU conditionality enables national politicians to resist 
pressure from domestic interest groups as well as gain interim 
credibility benefits such as lower investment risk premiums and 
higher foreign investment rates.111 
 
107 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 13 (June 22, 1993), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/PressData/en/ec 
/72921.pdf. 
108 Heather Grabbe, European Union Conditionality and the Acquis 
Communautaire, 23 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 249, 256 (2002) (outlining the process of 
accession for candidate countries). 
109 See James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse & Claire Gordon, Conditionality and 
Compliance in the EU’s Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-
national Government, 42 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 523, 523 (2004) (identifying the 
premise that EU conditionality exists because of power asymmetry).  Indeed, the 
dynamics of conditionality are outside the reach of this Article.  However, it 
suffices to say that candidate countries have tremendous financial power with 
transition assistance and potential access for post-accession structural funds.  See 
Council Regulation 622/98, art. 4, 1998 O.J. (L 85) 1, 2 (EC) (“[W]hen the 
commitments contained in the European Agreements are not respected and/or 
progress towards fulfilment [sic] of the Copenhagen criteria is insufficient, the 
Council . . . may take appropriate steps with regard to any pre-accession 
assistance granted to an applicant State.”).  See also Alain Guggenbühl & 
Margareta Theelen, The Financial Assistance of the European Union to Its Eastern and 
Southern Neighbours: A Comparative Analysis, in THE EU’S ENLARGEMENT AND 
MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 217 (Marc Maresceau & 
Erwan Lannon eds., 2001) (analyzing the EU’s financial transfers). 
110 Richard Bronk, Commitment and Credibility: EU Conditionality and Interim 
Gains (European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Working Paper No. 2002–02, 2002), available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3863. 
111 See Richard E. Baldwin, Joseph F. Francois & Richard Portes, The Costs and 
Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and Central Europe, 12 ECON. 
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The EU’s regular reports assess a candidate country’s progress 
toward meeting all of the requirements for membership.112  
Specifically, the regular reports and opinions serve a 
“gatekeeping” function because they are used to determine when 
further negotiations can commence, and thus provide a constraint 
on domestic policy.113  This is especially the case since democracy 
was linked with access to further membership negotiations at the 
Helsinki European Council in 1999.114  Notably, the EU was not the 
only institution to have influence over transition policies in CEE.  
Membership in the CoE requires ratification of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and the European Convention of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”).  The European Court of Justice 
often relies on ECHR jurisprudence in making the Council of 
Europe “a de facto condition” for a successful accession.115 
 
 
POL’Y 127, 139–42 (1997) (examining the effect of EU membership  on decreasing 
investment risk in Central and Eastern European countries). 
112 Grabbe, supra note 108, at 262. 
113 See Gwendolyn Sasse, The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality 
Revisited for the EU’s Eastern Neighbours, 60 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 295, 295 (2008) 
(likening the EU’s regular reports to the ENP Progress Reports because, just as 
regular reports monitor candidate countries’ progress in order to assess whether a 
candidate country can move further in the process of gaining membership to the 
EU, ENP Progress Reports help to determine whether the EU can create a 
stronger, or more intimate, relationship with a particular country); James Hughes 
& Gwendolyn Sasse, Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and 
Minority Protection in the CEECs, 1 J. ETHNOPOL. & MINORITY ISSUES IN EUR. 1, 2 
(2003) (analyzing the structure and content of the regular reports on candidate 
countries to determine whether there is a positive correlation between the reports 
and policy-making in the field of minority rights in these countries). 
114 See Grabbe, supra note 108, at 256.  (“The Helsinki European Council . . . 
made an explicit linkage between access to negotiations and the democracy 
condition for the first time . . . .”). 
115 See generally Gwendolyn Sasse, EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: 
Translating the Copenhagen Criterion into Policy (European University Institute, 
Working Paper No. 16, 2005).  Indeed the accession criteria of the EU and CoE are 
similar in many respects.  See EUR. PARL. ASS., Resolution 1115 on Setting Up of An 
Assembly Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member 
States of the Council of Europe, 1997 Sess., DOC. 7722 (1997); EUR. PARL. ASS., Order 
485 on the General Policy of the Council of Europe, 44th sess., Doc. 7277 (1993); EUR. 
PARL. ASS., Order 488 on the Honouring of Commitments Entered Into by New Member 
States, 39th Sess., Doc. No. 6682 (1993); EUR. PARL. ASS., Resolution 917 on a Special 
Guest Status with the Parliamentary Assembly, 39th Sess., Doc. 6036 (1989); EUR. 
PARL. ASS., Resolution 7037 on the Honouring of Commitments Entered Into by Member 
States When Joining the Council of Europe, 45th Sess., Doc. 7037(1994). 
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4. CASE STUDIES 
Lithuania and Estonia offer a unique opportunity for a 
comparative case study because both countries had the same 
experiences with the communist judicial system for the same 
period of time.116  The Baltic countries generally adopted liberal 
post-WWI constitutional frameworks committed to the democratic 
ideals that inspired the creation of the League of Nations.  The 
Soviet Union “liberated” Estonia and Lithuania from German 
occupation in 1944 and 1945, respectively.  After Lithuania and 
Estonia became Soviet republics, Moscow required that the codes 
and laws of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic 
(“RSFSR”) be applied, and subsequently replace all national 
laws.117  Judicial harmonization between the Estonian and 
Lithuanian republics and the USSR was complete by the early 
1950s and they remained synchronized until independence.118  
Zhdanovschina—the Soviet policy of asserting complete control 
through terror—was implemented throughout the Baltic States.119 
The constitutional arrangements of both countries were 
determined by their respective constitutions as well as the 
constitution of the USSR.  Thus Lithuania and Estonia have the 
same normative legacies as the USSR.  Moreover, both countries 
had similar pre-Soviet experiences with independence.  An 
independent Lithuania adopted a purposefully democratic 
constitution in the interwar years, which generally guaranteed 
individual rights and provided for the protection of minorities.120  
 
116 See supra Section 3. 
117 See Deitrich A. Loeber, Regional and National Variations: The Baltic Factor, in 
TOWARD THE “RULE OF LAW” IN RUSSIA? POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE 
TRANSITION PERIOD 77, 79 (Donald D. Barry ed., 1992) (noting that when Estonia 
and Lithuania were occupied by the USSR, RSFSR law resumed effect in the 
nations). 
118 See MARKKU SUKSI, ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF ESTONIA 16-17 
(1999) (discussing effect of Soviet occupation on Estonia’s legislative and judicial 
branches); V. STANLEY VARDYS & JUDITH B. SEDAITIS, LITHUANIA: THE REBEL NATION 
60 (1997) (asserting that politically, Lithuania was “forcibly socialized into Soviet 
norms and behaviour” and that culturally, Lithuania had to accept Russian 
personnel as well as the use of the Russian language in the country). 
119 See ANATOL LIEVEN, THE BALTIC REVOLUTION: ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA 
AND THE PATH TO INDEPENDENCE 92 (1993) (discussing Zhdanovschina in the Baltic 
states). 
120 See SUKSI, supra note 118, at 9–10.  All three Baltic States developed liberal 
constitutional frameworks in the interwar period.  Lithuania adopted a “highly 
democratic” constitution which generally guaranteed individual rights and 
provided for the protection of minorities.  LIEVEN, supra note 119, at 64; THOMAS 
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In the interwar years Estonia became a member of the League of 
Nations, and, like Lithuania, provided for minority protections, 
separation of powers, and elaborate guarantees of civil liberties in 
its 1920 Constitution.  The Estonian Constitution was considered 
advanced among the contemporary constitutions of that era.121 
4.1. Lithuania 
4.1.1. Institutional and Contextual Factors 
Independence brought the annulment of the Lithuanian SSR 
and Soviet Constitutions and a reorientation towards a law-
governed Lithuania.122  Consequentially, motivated by a desire to 
break away from Lithuania’s communist past and the lingering 
distrust of the judiciary’s ability to overrule the legislature, the 
framers of the new Lithuanian Constitution aimed to establish 
judicial review in accordance with the classic Austrian system of 
justice.123  Article 102 of the Lithuanian Constitution establishes the 
jurisdiction of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court (“Konstitucinis 
Teismas”) by providing that the “The Constitutional Court shall 
decide whether the laws and other legal acts adopted by the 
Lithuanian Parliament (“Seimas”) are in conformity with the 
Constitution and legal acts adopted by the President and the 
Government, do not violate the Constitution or laws.”124  
Furthermore, Article 104 of the Constitution mandates that the 
Lithuanian Constitutional Court operate separately from all other 
State institutions.125 
Moreover, Article 110 of the Lithuanian Constitution creates a 
“centralized” model of judicial review by denying trial and 
regional courts the authority to review the constitutionality of 
legislative and executive enactments.126  In contrast to the 
 
LANE, LITHUANIA: STEPPING WESTWARD 19 (2001).  An independent Estonia can be 
traced to the Nystad Treaty of 1721.  Loeber, supra note 117, at 78. 
121 SUKSI, supra note 118, at 9–10. 
122 LANE, supra note 120, at 132. 
123 Sabaliūns, supra note 72, at 786. 
124 LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 102 (1992) (Lith.) 
(emphasis added). 
125 Id. art. 104. 
126 Sabaliūnas, supra note 72, at 785 (“Apparently, distrust of the courts 
associated with the communist past, doubts about the concentration of judicial 
powers, a belief in the effectiveness of special-purpose tribunals, and favourable 
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American model, lower courts are required to suspend the 
proceeding and refer constitutional questions to the Constitutional 
Court for review.  After the Constitutional Court determines the 
constitutionality of the law in question, the case is then able to 
proceed in the lower court. 
Authority to petition the Lithuanian Constitutional Court 
regarding the constitutionality of an act of government resides in a 
number of actors.  First, one-fifth of the Seimas members or a 
reference from a lower court may challenge an act of the 
government or the President.127  Furthermore, the President, the 
government, the courts, as well as the one-fifth of the Seimas may 
also challenge the constitutionality of an act passed by the Seimas.  
In the period from 1993 to 2009, the overwhelming majority of the 
432 constitutional challenges were brought by the one-fifth of the 
Seimas and by the courts.128  There is also a formal requirement that 
the reasons a case should be heard by the Constitutional Court be 
stated in the arguments; in practice, however, it has proven 
sufficient to merely assert that a given act is unconstitutional.129 
The framers of the Lithuanian Constitution believed that 
international law should apply in domestic courts so that domestic 
law would be harmonious with international norms, especially in 
the area of human rights.130  However, the Lithuanian Constitution 
makes provisions for the incorporation of international treaties into 
domestic law, but without specifying supremacy or precedence of 
such international treaties.131  Article 138 states that ratified 
international treaties “shall be of the constituent part of the legal 
system of the Republic of Lithuania.”132  The Constitutional Court 
has also affirmed this “monist” approach to the incorporation of 
 
impressions of the constitutional courts in Western Europe have combined to 
predispose the framers to this particular institution.”). 
127 LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 106 (1992) (Lith.). 
128 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, Statistics on Petitions 
and Inquiries Received at the Constitutional Court, http://www.lrkt.lt/Statistics1 
_e_s.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
129 Sabaliūnas, supra note 72, at 788. 
130 Kūris, supra note 22, at 370. 
131 Vereshchetin, supra note 105, at 35. 
132 LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 138 (1992) (Lith.). 
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international law into Lithuanian domestic legal framework 
without any enabling requirements.133 
4.1.2. Case Law 
4.1.2.1. The Death Penalty 
The death penalty has a long history in Lithuania; the first legal 
provisions regulating its application go back to the sixteenth 
century.  Although the practice was abolished briefly by the 1920 
Constitution, the Soviets re-imposed it for a multitude of crimes 
deemed to be counter-revolutionary.134  Although the Soviet and 
Lithuanian SSR Constitutions were annulled at independence, the 
Seimas adopted the Soviet Criminal Code which included the death 
penalty.135  A series of amendments were adopted, yet the death 
penalty was preserved because a large proportion of the public 
opinion (between 70 and 80 percent) favored the practice.136  This 
led to the Seimas’ failure to ratify Protocol 6 of the ECHR requiring 
the abolition of the death penalty. 
As permitted by the Constitution, a minority of members of the 
Seimas brought a challenge in the Constitutional Court that the 
death penalty was incompatible with the Lithuanian Constitution.  
Specifically, the challenges were based on Articles 18, 19, and 21(3), 
guaranteeing the natural rights of individuals, granting citizens the 
right to life, and prohibiting torture or treatment that degrades 
human dignity, respectively.137  The Constitutional Court 
considered the challenge to the death penalty in the case of 
December 9, 1998. 
The Court’s reasoning was grounded in international human 
rights norms:  it utilized a significant amount of international law, 
not only in direct application, but also in its non-binding dicta and 
 
133 The monist approach to the interaction between international and 
domestic law was confirmed by the Constitutional Court.  On International 
Treaties of the Republic of Lithuania, Advisory Op., Const. Ct. Lith., Oct. 7, 1995. 
134 Vaidotas Vaicaitis, Note, The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania 
and the Death Penalty: A Note on the Judgment of 9 December 1988 [sic], 26 REV. CENT. 
& E. EUR. L. 85, 96–97 (2000). 
135 Id. at 86–87. 
136 On the Death Penalty Provided for by the Sanction of Article 105 of the 
Criminal Code (Death Penalty Case), Const. Ct. Lith., Dec. 9, 1998, translated at 
http://www.lrkt.lt/dokumentai/1998/n8a1209a.htm. 
137 Id. § I, paras. 1–5. 
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legal reasoning.  Many of the experts’ opinions were grounded in 
the recognition that most European states and governmental 
organization favor abolishing the death penalty.  The Court 
acknowledged CoE Recommendation 1246 stating that the “death 
penalty has no legitimate place in the penal systems.”138  The Court 
noted the CoE’s Resolution 1044 declaration that ratification of 
Protocol 6 of the ECHR should be a prerequisite to EU 
membership.139  The decision further acknowledged that the 
abolition of the death penalty was a de facto requirement for EU 
membership, and that the general trend in Europe was the 
abolition of the death penalty (which essentially all European 
countries had done). 
The essence of the concrete legal reasoning beyond that of the 
non-binding dicta was rooted in a dual reading of Articles 135 and 
138 of the Lithuanian Constitution.  Article 135 states that the 
“principles and norms of international law” are to be pursued by 
Lithuania.140  Article 138 states that international agreements are 
automatically incorporated by the Lithuanian legal system.141  
These two provisions read together, according to the Court, 
required it be noted that: 
[T]he  State  of  Lithuania,  recognising the principles  and  
norms  of  international  norms,  may  not apply virtually  
different  standards  to  the  people of this country.  
Holding  that  it  is  a  member  of  the international 
community possessing  equal  rights,  the  State  of  
Lithuania, of its own free will, adopts and recognises these 
principles and norms, the customs of the international 
 
138  EUR. PARL. ASS., Recommendation 1246 on the Abolition of Capital Punishment, 
Res. No. 1246 (1994).  See also EUR. PARL. ASS., Report 7154 on the Abolition of Capital 
Punishment, Rep. No. 7154 (1994); Death Penalty Case, § III, para. 10–12 (opining 
that the death penalty is rarely necessary and society can be protected in other 
ways). 
139 Death Penalty Case, § III, para. 12.  See also EUR. PARL. ASS., Resolution 1044 
on the Abolition of Capital Punishment, Res. No. 1044 (1994) (“The adequate 
implementation of the additional protocol to the European Convention on Human 
Rights should be a matter of continuous concern to the Assembly and the 
willingness to ratify the protocol be made a prerequisite for membership of the 
Council of Europe.”). 
140 LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 135 (1992) (Lith.). 
141 Id. art. 138. 
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community, and naturally integrates itself into the world 
culture and becomes its natural part.142 
Yet there was no international law to which Lithuania was a 
party that mandated the abolition of the death penalty.  The 1966 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights sanctions the application of 
the death penalty for the most egregious crimes.143  The 1953 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms also allows the death penalty to be applied 
for crimes mandated by law.144  What is interesting about the 
Court’s opinion is that it considers the abolition of the death 
penalty as part of a process rather than something which has been 
established.145 
Lastly, the decision cited European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”) jurisprudence for guidance on the administration of the 
death penalty.146  Specifically, the decision noted the definition of  
punishment in Ireland v. United Kingdom,147 which concerned police 
abuse and torture of suspects relating to the conflict in Northern 
Ireland.  The Constitutional Court defined what types of treatment 
and punishment are prohibited.148 
 
142 Death Penalty Case, § VI, para. 20. 
143 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6(2), Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, 
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance 
with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary 
to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be 
carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court.”). 
144 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“Everyone’s 
right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction 
of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”). 
145 Vaicaitis, supra note 134, at 87–89.  
146 Death Penalty Case, § VI, para. 74. 
147 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 (ser. A) (1978). 
148 Death Penalty Case, § VI, para. 74.  The Constitutional Court noted that the 
European Court of Human Rights prohibited: 
torture-deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel 
suffering; inhuman treatment or punishment-infliction of severe mental 
or physical suffering; degrading treatment or punishment-treatment 
such as to arouse in the victim a feeling of fear, anguish and inferiority 
capable of humiliating and debasing him and possibly breaking his 
physical or moral resistance. 
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The ECtHR decision did not consider retributive justice 
including the death penalty.  Ireland v. United Kingdom involved 
only the treatment of pre-trial detainees.  Yet the Court was able to 
link human degradation as a result of torture to the death penalty.  
The Constitutional Court observed that the Lithuanian 
Constitution “links the prohibition to torture, injure, degrade, 
maltreat a person, as well as that to establish such punishments, 
with the activities of the state and its respective institutions.” 149  
The Court then proceeded to hold that: 
Assessing the death penalty through the prism of the 
treatment which is prohibited by the Constitution, its 
specific aspect is revealed. Degradation of the dignity of the 
convict derives essentially from the cruelty of the death 
penalty itself. The cruelty manifests itself by the fact that 
after the death sentence has been carried out, the human 
essence of the criminal is negated as well, he is deprived of 
any human dignity, as the state in that case treats the 
person as a mere object to be eliminated from the human 
community.150 
The Court ruled that the death penalty was incompatible with 
the Lithuanian constitution and, thus, was annulled.151 
The main arguments of the Court in striking down the death 
penalty were rooted in “external validity.”152  The Court looked to 
international law in its reasoning but did so in a way that went 
beyond the Constitution’s “monist” provision of directly applying 
international law in domestic courts.153  The Constitutional Court 
was under no direct obligation to strike down the death penalty 
 
Id.  The Constitutional Court read the European Court of Human Rights’ holding 
with Article 21 of the Lithuanian Constitution which provides in part that: “The 
dignity of the human being shall be protected by law.  It shall be prohibited to 
torture, injure a human being, degrade his dignity, subject him to cruel treatment 
as well as establish such punishments.” LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA 
[Constitution] art. 21(2)–(3) (1992) (Lith.). 
149 Death Penalty Case, § VI, para. 75.  
150 Id. § VI, para. 78. 
151 Id. § VI, para. 83. 
152 Vaicaitis, supra note 134, at 104. 
153 See LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 138 (1992) 
(Lith.) (providing in part that “International agreements which are ratified by the 
Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania shall be the constituent part of the legal system 
of the Republic of Lithuania.”). 
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because of the inapplicability of Protocol 6 of the ECHR.  Rather, 
the Court looked to CoE and EU non-binding resolutions and the 
practice of other European nations as external source legitimacy.  
The Court also framed the opinion in the context of being part of a 
greater European community in which the death penalty was 
becoming passé.  The Court highlighted the 1998 EU Regular 
Report’s identification of the death penalty as an unresolved 
problem regarding accession.154  Thus, the Court established its 
independence and legitimacy by way of international political 
constraints through the formal and informal utilization of 
international law. 
4.1.2.2. Criminal Procedure 
The pervasive suspicion regarding laws and judges in the 
former Soviet Union extended to legal practitioners as well.  
Defense attorneys (“advokat”) had to negotiate a precarious 
position as agents of the state and agents against the state.  The 
legal status of attorneys was formalized and regulated in the early 
Stalinist years when 8,000 advocates were authorized to serve a 
population of 191 million.155  All attorneys were subservient to the 
Communist Party and required to disseminate propaganda 
through public lectures, and approximately 60 percent of attorneys 
were members of the Communist Party.156  However, the role of 
defense attorneys was also by its nature anti-State: the defense of 
clients accused of committing an offence against the state could be 
seen as an affront to the state itself. 
Soviet criminal procedure was an Orwellian amalgamation of 
an inquisitorial approach and authoritarianism.  The desire for 
high conviction rates led to high discretion regarding what 
evidence was admitted into the trial and whom to charge with a 
crime.  Much of the pre-trial procedure involved the investigation 
by an agent of the Office of the Procurator-General, usually a KGB 
member.157  A subject of much debate in the former Soviet Union 
 
154 See European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Lithuania’s 
Progress towards Accession, at 9, COM(1998) 706 final (noting Lithuania’s failure to 
abolish the death penalty). 
155 Pamela Jordan, The Russian Advokatura (Bar) and the State in the 1990s, 50 
EUR.-ASIA STUD. 765, 766 (1998) (citing Polozhenie ob Advokature SSSR’ [VVS 
RSFSR] [Decree on the Bar of the USSR] 1939, 49, item 394). 
156 Id. at 766–767. 
157 See Donald D. Barry & Harold J. Berman, The Soviet Legal Profession, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 28 (1968) (noting that the procuracy, the civilian police and the 
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was the role of a defense attorney in the pre-trial process.  Because 
of the quest for high conviction rates (incidentally around 99 
percent), and the nature of the inquisitorial system, counsel was 
denied during criminal investigations and interrogations.158  
Although formal guarantees of attorney-client privilege existed, 
only around 35 percent of attorneys were present during 
preliminary investigations.159 
The backlash to authoritarian rule was the widespread desire to 
state power.  One of these expressions was the popular acceptance 
of the constitutional guarantee that all persons suspected or 
accused of a crime have a right to legal counsel.160  Yet in 1994 the 
police refused to grant two defendants access to council during 
their preliminary interrogations based on an exception contained 
within the Code of Criminal Procedure.161  Article 58(3)(2) of the 
Code stipulated that where the access to counsel jeopardizes an 
impartial investigation, the investigator can observe 
correspondence between the accused and their attorney for fifteen 
days.162  The Vilnius Second District Court halted its proceedings, 
 
KGB each had investigators who were responsible for objectively considering the 
evidence against an accused and deciding whether to indict). 
158 See Eugene Huskey, The Politics of the Soviet Criminal Process: Expanding the 
Right to Counsel in Pre-Trial Proceedings, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 95-102 (1986) 
(describing the struggle between conservatives and reformists who campaigned 
for counsel to be involved in pre-trial processes). 
159 Id. at 105. 
160 See LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 31 (1992) (Lith.) 
(“From the moment of arrest or first interrogation, persons suspected or accused 
of a crime shall be guaranteed the right to defence [sic] and legal counsel.”) 
161 On the confidentiality of legal counsel (Criminal Procedure Case), Const. 
Ct. Lith, Nov. 18, 1994, available at http://lrkt.lt/dokumentai/1994/n4a1118a.htm.  
Both defendants were charged with extortion of public property.  Id. 
162 Id. § III, para.7. 
The legislator, conforming to the necessity of the control of evidence 
material, in item 3, part 2, Article 58 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
established such a rule by the Law of 10 December 1991: ‘In cases when 
there are grounds for maintaining that such meetings will have negative 
influence on a thorough and impartial investigation of the circumstances 
of the case, an interrogator or investigator shall be allowed to participate 
in the conversations between a counsel and a defendant and control the 
correspondence with a person suspected or accused of a crime within the 
first 15 days of detention or arrest; further participation in the 
conversations of a counsel and a defendant and control of 
correspondence shall be possible only on the consent of a procurator or a 
judge.’ 
Id. (quoting LITH. CRIM. CODE. art. 58(3)(2) (1991)). 
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and petitioned the Constitutional Court to ascertain the 
constitutionality of Article 58.163  Thus, in the Criminal Procedure 
Case, the Constitutional Court was confronted with the tricky task 
of balancing public pressure against government action. 
As was the case with the death penalty, the Constitutional 
Court in this case, in balancing the rights of the defendant against 
the power of the state, looked to international law for guidance 
when it was not under an obligation to do so.  The opinion first 
compared the norms of the Code of Criminal Procedure to relevant 
provisions of international law.  The Constitutional Court took 
note of a United Nations General Assembly resolution declaring 
that all detained individuals be provided access to legal counsel 
immediately upon arrest.164  Specifically, the Court took note of the 
principles which establish exceptions for exceptional circumstances 
relating to investigations.165  Pursuant to the General Assembly’s 
resolution, a detained person’s access to counsel may be lawfully 
delayed “when it is considered indispensable by a judicial or other 
authority in order to maintain security and good order.”166 
The Constitutional Court, moreover, looked to the ECHR 
provisions dealing with the right to legal counsel.167  Specifically, 
 
163 Id. § I, para. 3. 
164 Id. § III, para. 11.  See also Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 173, at 297 
U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 (1988) [hereinafter 
Body of Principles]. 
165 Criminal Procedure Case, § III, para. 24. 
166 Body of Principles, supra note 164, at 299.  Specifically the Constitutional 
Court took notice of Principles 15, 16 and 18.  Principle 15 provides in full that 
“Notwithstanding the exceptions . . . communication of the detained or 
imprisoned person with the outside world, and in particular his family or counsel, 
shall not be denied for more than a matter of days.” Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  The two exceptions to providing accused individuals with immediate 
access to legal counsel are outlined in Principles 16 and 18.  Principle 16(4) states 
that: “Any notification referred to in the present principle shall be made or 
permitted to be made without delay.  The competent authority may however 
delay a notification for a reasonable period where exceptional needs of the 
investigation so require.”  Id.  Principle 18(3) similarly provides: 
The right of a detained or imprisoned person to be visited by and to 
consult and communicate, without delay or censorship and in full 
confidentiality, with his legal counsel may not be suspended or restricted 
save in exceptional circumstances, to be specified by law or lawful 
regulations, when it is considered indispensable by a judicial or other 
authority in order to maintain security and good order. 
Id. See also Criminal Procedure Case, § III, para.24 (discussing G.A. Res. 43/173). 
167 Criminal Procedure Case, § III, para.12. 
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the Court looked to Article 6(3) of the ECHR which outlines the 
right of the accused to obtain access to counsel, to prepare a 
defense, and to promptly be informed of the “nature and cause of 
the accusation against him.”168  However, Article 6 of the ECHR 
does not contain a special circumstances exception for access to 
counsel.  Interestingly, in order to avoid a conflict between the 
Criminal Code and the ECHR, the Constitutional Court analogized 
Article 6 of the ECHR to Articles 17 and 52 of the Lithuanian 
Criminal Code.169  Indeed, the Lithuanian Criminal Code does 
mandate that defendants have access to counsel, are entitled to 
prepare a defense and have other rights similar to those contained 
in Article 6 of the ECHR.170  In so doing, the Court concluded that 
“[t]he norms of the Code of Criminal Procedure are actually in 
conformity according to their contents with the international 
instruments regulating the right to defence.”171 
To bolster this conclusion—that the ECHR is in conformity 
with the Lithuanian Criminal Code—the Court took note of the 
case of Campbell v. United Kingdom.172  The Constitutional Court 
noted that the ECtHR stated that the guarantee of access to legal 
counsel may be given “wider interpretation” in light of the 
ECHR.173  As such, a state may legitimately restrict access to 
counsel when there is a risk that the defense may abuse its status, 
thereby hindering the proceedings. 
Lastly, the Constitutional Court looked to the laws in other 
European jurisdictions.  The Court observed that Swedish law 
prescribes that “confidential meetings are possible only on the 
permission of an investigator, procurator or judge.”174  The Court 
also noted an exception to attorney-client confidentiality found in 
Article 45 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.  Explaining  
the provision, the Court wrote, “when there are circumstances due 
to which the conversation between a lawyer and a defendant may 
 
168 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
6(3)(a), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
169 Criminal Procedure Case, § III, para. 13. 
170 Id. (citing LITH. CRIM. CODE. arts. 17 & 52 (1991)). 
171 Id. 
172 Campbell v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992) (finding the 
screening of correspondence between Campbell and his attorney by U.K. prison 
officials to be a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.) 
173 Criminal Procedure Case, § III, para. 25. 
174 Id. § III, para. 23. 
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have negative influence on the collection of evidence, the order 
may be given to observe the meetings of a lawyer with his 
defendant within the first 14 days of arrest.”175  Similar exceptions 
to attorney-client confidentiality and access were found in the 
criminal laws of Italy, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, were cited by 
the Constitutional Court in dicta.176 
All of the foregoing precedent allowed the Constitutional Court 
to conclude that the “norm of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
[restricting the right to legal counsel] not only is in conformity with 
the Constitution but also is in accord with the underlying 
provisions of the Law on Criminal Procedure and is based on legal 
practice of foreign states and the logic of the reality [sic] our 
country’s judicial life.”177  However, at the time the opinion was 
handed down in 1994, Lithuania was not a party to the ECHR.  
Accordingly, Article 138 of the Lithuanian Constitution mandating 
that international law be directly incorporated into domestic law 
did not apply and was not invoked by the Constitutional Court.178  
Indeed, at the time did the EU did not issue regular reports which 
included the protection of individual rights in the criminal justice 
system, nor had the EU “pre-accession strategy” been launched at 
the 1994 Essen European Council.179 
The international political pressure present in the death penalty 
case was thus absent in this instance.  Moreover, the means of 
obtaining constitutional review differed; the appeal was from a 
lower court, not members of the Seimas.  Still, the Constitutional 
Court used non-binding international law as external legitimacy in 
upholding the exception to the attorney-client relationship.  The 
international political context and means of review are insufficient 
as explanations for the Court’s jurisprudence.  These two cases, 
read in combination, imply that judicial legitimacy and 
independence was asserted by the use of international legal 
references independent of the international political context and 
means of review. 
 
175 Id.  
176 Id. 
177 Id. § III, para. 2. 
178 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
179 See generally Marc Maresceau, Pre-Accession, in THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 9 (Marise Cremona, ed. 2003) (discussing EU enlargement and 
pre-accession strategies including EU initiatives to align member countries 
politically, economically, and legally in an effort to promote new-member 
assimilation to the EU). 
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4.2. Estonia 
4.2.1. Institutional and Contextual Factors 
Like their Lithuanian counterparts, the creation of a law-based 
state was atop the reform priorities of the Estonian Popular Front, 
which included that goal in their 1988 charter.180  Yet the desire to 
create a Rechtsstaat did not manifest into the creation of a special 
Constitutional Court, as it did in Lithuania.  All Central and 
Eastern European countries to emerge from communism adopted a 
legal system in the Austrian tradition with a constitutional court, 
with one notable exception: Estonia.181 
The Estonian legal system does not, however, operate 
exclusively in the American tradition.  The Estonian National 
Court (Riigikohus) was successful in obtaining constitutional review 
jurisdiction in a similar vein to the American model of 
jurisprudence.  The amount of constitutional disputes was seen, at 
the time, as insufficient to require a special tribunal to adjudicate 
them.182  This is stipulated in Article 149 of the Estonian 
Constitution which states: “The Supreme Court is the highest court 
in the state and shall review court judgments.”183  Article 149 of the 
Estonian Constitution further grants the Supreme Court 
constitutional review authority.184  A special tribunal—the 
Constitutional Review Chamber (“CRC”)—was established within 
the National Court to be responsible for adjudicating constitutional 
disputes.185  Notwithstanding a specialized body within the 
National Court dedicated to hearing constitutional issues, the 
nature of the Estonian court system can best be characterized as 
“diffuse;” in contrast to the “centralized” model adopted by 
Lithuania in the Austrian-Kelsen tradition. 
Article 149 of the Constitution provides that cases are to 
proceed by “cassation proceedings,” meaning an intermediate 
 
180 Loeber, supra note 117, at 80. 
181 Schwartz, Eastern European Courts, supra note 3, at 198 (stating that Estonia 
was the only of the emerging Central and Eastern European countries where the 
new power of constitutional judicial review was successful). 
182 SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST 
EUROPE, supra note 3, at 253 note 7. 
183 EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS [Constitution] art. 149 (1992) (Est.). 
184 Id. art. 149. 
185 Id.  
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court has the right to review the decision of lower courts.186  The 
Estonian Constitution further prohibits lower courts from applying 
acts which contradict the Constitution. Article 152 provides:  “In a 
court proceeding, the court shall not apply any law or other 
legislation that is in conflict with the Constitution.  The Supreme 
Court shall declare invalid any law or other legislation that is in 
conflict with the provisions and spirit of the Constitution.”187  
Furthermore, the selection of judges for the CRC does not differ in 
the selection of judges from the National Court.188  This, according 
to the CoE, may lead to increased influence of other bodies of 
government on the CRC, because it is not isolated, as would be the 
case with a Kelsen-style Constitutional Court.189  No further 
provisions are enumerated specifying that lower courts are 
required, as a matter of procedure, to refer constitutional issues to 
the CRC, as are enumerated in the Lithuanian Constitution.190  If 
the Estonian Constitution contained such a requirement, the legal 
system could be considered to operate analogously to the diffuse 
Austrian/Kelsen model.  However, Article 149, read in conjunction 
with Article 152, gives lower courts authority to review 
constitutional matters, just like lower courts in the American 
system.  For example, in 2005 the Tallinn Circuit Court—an 
appellate court—reversed a lower court judgment on the grounds 
that two provisions of the law in question were unconstitutional.191  
 
186 Id.  
187 Id. art. 152. 
188 Sergio Bartole, European Commission for Democracy through Law, The Reform 
of Constitutional Justice in Estonia, (EC) No. CDL (97)053 (1997).  
189 Id. at 7 (stating that the establishment of a constitutional court in Estonia is 
necessary for protecting liberties); Sergio Bartole & Helmut Steinberger, European 
Commission for Democracy through Law, Opinion on the Reform of Constitutional Justice 
in Estonia (EC) No. CDL (98)059 (1998). 
190 The appellate procedure was confirmed by the CRC in Review of the 
Petition of the Valga County Court (Valga City Rules), (Valga County Ct. June 9, 
1997, No. 3–4–1–3–97, available at http://www.nc.ee/?id=465&print=1.  In Valga 
City Rules, the Valga administrative judge refused to apply a section of the city 
rules requiring minors under 16 to be accompanied by an adult between 11:00pm 
and 6:00am.  Id. pmbl., paras. 1–2.  The CRC noted that the “Valga administrative 
judge . . . did not apply clause 3.19 of Part I of the Valga City Rules . . . to the 
extent that it prescribed for a restriction of the freedom of movement of persons 
under 16 years of age . . . .” Id. pmbl., para. 1.  The court did this on its own, 
without referring this constitutional matter to another court. 
191 See Petition of Tallinn Circuit Court to Declare Sentences 3 and 5 of § 
131(2) of Law of Property Act Implementation Act Invalid (Property 
Implementation Act II), No. 3–4–1–16–05, § 1, para. 5 (Riigikohus [Supreme Court] 
Dec. 15, 2005) (invalidating the judgment of the County Court, declining to apply 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/4
 
2009] TOWARD AN INTERPRETIVE MODEL  247 
Additionally the Tallinn Administrative Court—a court of first 
instance—rendered Section 25(3) of the Property Law Enforcement 
Act unconstitutional in a case in 1994.192 
Indeed, the Estonian court system has been criticized for its 
lack of a Constitutional Court.  The CoE has championed the role 
of the Austrian system of judicial review in Europe.193  Others have 
recommended that Estonia reconfigure its judicial institutions and 
procedures to incorporate a Constitutional Court.194  This is 
because a Constitutional Court, with its special status and 
increased insularity, is perceived as a better guarantor of 
individual liberties and observer of government power. 
Like the American court system, the Estonian Constitution 
provides that constitutional review can be done ex post through the 
regular procedure of appealing a lower court decision upwards to 
the National Court.195  That is, any party whose case is in either a 
court of first instance or in an appellate proceeding can challenge 
the constitutionality of any Act.  The lower courts are also given 
the authority to rule on the constitutionality of any Act during the 
 
and declaring unconstitutional the third and fifth sentences of § 131(2) of LPAIA, 
giving a co-owner of property a right of pre-emption). 
192 Review of the constitutionality of § 25(3) of the Law of Property Act 
Implementation Act to the extent that it repeals of § 30(2) of the Farm Act of the 
Estonian SSR (Property Implementation Act I), No. III–4/A–5/94 (Riigikohus 
[Supreme Court] Sept. 30, 1994).  The CRC noted that: 
On 27 May 1994 the Tallinn Administrative Court decided to satisfy the 
request of Elmar Rikmann and not to apply § 25(3) of the Law of 
Property Act Implementation Act to the extent that it repealed § 30(2) of 
the Farm Act, as the provision was in conflict with § 10 of the 
Constitution.  The Tallinn Administrative Court held that § 10 of the 
Constitution establishes the principles of a state based on democracy, 
social justice and the rule of law as a basis for the legal system of Estonia.  
Observance of the principles of the rule of law requires the guaranteeing 
and safeguarding of the people’s confidence in the law and in the 
lawfulness of state authorities. 
Id. para. 3.  In this case, a statute stated that farms set up on the basis of that 
statute would be exempt from taxes for five years.  A later statute then imposed 
taxes on those farms within the five years.  The Court ruled that the latter statute 
was unconstitutional. 
193 See Bartole, supra note 188 (stating a preference for the Austrian System of 
judicial review). 
194 Id. at 6. 
195 EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS [Constitution] art. 24 (1992) (Est.). 
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proceeding.196  As such, the Estonian legal system is characteristic 
of a diffuse system of judicial review.197 
However, Estonia does provide for abstract review in two 
particular circumstances, thus distinguishing it from the American 
system.  The National Court may review the constitutionality of a 
proposed law ex ante on request of the President where he or she 
has used a veto and the Riigikogu had subsequently passed the 
law without amendment.198  The National Court can also abstractly 
review a law ex post under authority granted by Articles 142 and 
152 of the Constitution.199  Under those circumstances, the Legal 
Chancellor has authority to challenge the constitutionality of a law 
promulgated by a state government or executive authority in the 
National Court.200  It is to be noted, however, that within a few 
years of independence, the lower courts have been more assertive 
in exercising their authority to declare acts unconstitutional.  
Appeals from lower courts have outnumbered the references from 
the Legal Chancellor and President since 1997.201 
Like the Lithuanian Constitution, the Estonian Constitution 
adopted a monist approach to applying international law in 
domestic courts.  However, Estonia recognizes the supremacy of 
international law over domestic laws.202  The Estonian Constitution 
expressly provides that “[i]f laws or other legislation of Estonia are 
in conflict with international treaties ratified by the Riigikogu, the 
provisions of the international treaty shall apply.”203  This was 
expressly recognized by the Constitutional Review Chamber which 
ruled that domestic laws which conflict with the obligations of 
international treaties are to be set aside by the courts.204  This is, of 
course, part of the diffuse nature of the Estonian legal system in 
 
196 Id. art. 152. See also Valga City Rules, pmbl., paras. 1-2; Property 
Implementation Act II, § 1, para. 5; Property Implementation Act, para. 3 (finding an 
act to be unconstitutional  in all of these cases). 
197 SUKSI, supra note 118, at 29. 
198 EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS [Constitution] art. 107 (1992) (Est.). 
199 Id. arts. 142, 152. 
200 Id. arts. 142, 152. 
201 Maveety & Grosskopf, supra note 8, at 472 n. 9. 
202 Vereshchetin, supra note 104, at 34. 
203 EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS [Constitution] art. 123 (1992) (Est.). 
204 Review of the petition of the Tallinn Administrative Court of 12 May 1997 
to declare invalid § 41 of the Police Service Regulations (Police Service 
Regulations), No. 3–4–1–1–97, § II para. 3 (Riigikohus [Supreme Court] June 11, 
1997). 
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that lower courts are given authority to declare domestic 
legislation unconstitutional.  This provision, like that of Lithuania, 
is also conducive of the courts being able to assert legitimacy and 
independence. 
4.2.2. Case Law 
4.2.2.1. The Police Act Case 
Under communism, the police functioned as a milita whose 
mission it was to protect the existing communist regime with little 
regard for the rule of law.  Under the direction of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, the police compiled secret files and conducted 
interrogations on the mere suspicion that an individual was 
engaging in subversive activities, or simply for blatant 
harassment.205  This normative experience under communism was 
difficult to reform in light of the clandestine, communist mindset 
that police duties were extraordinary and that public 
accountability would only reduce effectiveness.206 
Police reform began in Estonia with the Police Act of 1990,207 
which was subsequently revised by the Riigikogu in April 1993.208  
Contained in its provisions is the authorization of the police to 
“implement special surveillance measures in performance of their 
duties, only upon written consent of a National Court justice.”209  
The Legal Chancellor appealed to the Riigikogu to revoke the 
provision of special surveillance, which the Riigikogu refused to 
do.  The Legal Chancellor then petitioned the CRC to invalidate the 
 
205 Sanja Kutnjak Ivković & Maria R. Haberfeld, Transformation from Militia to 
Police in Croatia and Poland: A Comparative Prespective, 23 POLICING: INT’L J. OF 
POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 194, 195–96 (2000). 
206 Bill Hebenton & Jon Spencer, Assessing International Assistance in Law 
Enforcement: Themes, Findings and Recommendations from a Case-Study of the Republic 
of Estonia, EUR. INST. CRIME PREVENTION & CONTROL, Pub. Series No. 37, at 7 (2001). 
207 Police Act, 10 Riigi Teataja [State Gazette] 113 (1990) (outlining the role, 
function, and duties of the police force, with specific details regarding acceptable 
police behavior). 
208 Police of the Republic of Estonia Amendment Act, 20 Riigi Teataja [State 
Gazette] 355 (1993). 
209 Review of the Petition of the Chancellor of Justice, submitted under § 
142(2) of the Constitution, for the declaration of invalidity of subindent 4 of Part II 
of the Republic of Estonia Police Act Amendment Act under § Article 152(2) of the 
Constitution (Police Act Case), No. III-4/A-1/94, § 1, para. 1. (Riigikohus 
[Supreme Court] Dec. 15, 2005). 
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provision on the grounds that it was unconstitutional.210  As 
previously discussed, judicial independence is viewed in light of 
its insularity from influence and pressure from other branches of 
government regarding a particular policy consequence.  In light of 
the communist police legacy and parliament members’ support of 
special surveillance provisions, the judicial curtailment of police 
powers is a policy area which can demonstrate how judicial 
independence can be established. 
The Legal Chancellor asserted that the term “special operative 
surveillance measures” was undefined211 in violation of Section 11 
of the Constitution.212  Specifically, it was argued that the Act 
“leaves it up to discretion of the security police officers and a 
justice of the Supreme Court to decide: (1) what is to be deemed a 
special operative surveillance measure; (2) what are the cases and 
procedure for application of those special measures which have not 
been regulated by the law.”213  The CRC began its analysis by 
analogizing “recognized principles” of international law to Section 
3 of the Estonian Constitution, which establishes that individual 
rights and liberities can only be restricted in accordance with the 
law.214  The CRC also took notice of Article 8 of the ECHR 
regarding privacy in the home, family, and communications.215  
Accordingly, the CRC held that Part II(4) of the Police Act was 
incompatible with the Constitution because the scope of police 
 
210 Id. § 1, para 5. 
211 Id.  § 1, paras. 2–4. 
212  EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS[CONSTITUTION] art. 11 (1992) (Est.) (“Rights 
and freedoms may be restricted only in accordance with the Constitution. Such 
restrictions must be necessary in a democratic society and shall not distort the 
nature of the rights and freedoms restricted.”). 
213 Police Act Case, § 1 at para. 3. 
214 Id.  § 4, para. 4. 
215 Id. § 4, para. 6.  See also European Convention for the Protection of  Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.  Article 
8 provides in full: 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. 
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discretion to institute special surveillance measures was wider 
than the Constitution permitted.216 
As was the case with its Lithuanian counterpart, the Estonian 
Supreme Court interpreted Estonian Constitutional provisions in 
light of international law when it was not under an obligation to do 
so.  Estonia became a signatory of the ECHR in 1996.217  Just as the 
Lithuanian Constitutional Court, Estonia became a signatory while  
its courts were asserting legitimacy and independence against the 
power of the executive and legislative branches of government.218  
Thus, the method of incorporation of international treaties into 
domestic law was inapplicable in this instance for lack of a ratified 
treaty.  Moreover, international political influence had not 
developed to a significant point by the time the decision was 
rendered in 1994.  Yet the Court looked to international law as an 
external source of legitimacy in an almost identical way to that 
which the Lithuanian Constitutional Court did in 1994 and 1998, 
notwithstanding the systemic differences among their judiciaries. 
4.2.2.2. The Language Act 
Perhaps in no other context is a counter-majoritarian issue 
more clear than with the contentious minority issues in Estonia.  
After World War II, the Soviets began a policy of forced 
Russification within the Baltic countries to counteract the massive 
population losses of the war. 
Soviet policy encouraged the relocation of Russians to the 
Soviet republics. These migrants brought with them both their 
language and culture.219  Demobilized Russian soldiers were 
provided with employment throughout the Baltics.220  
Zhdanovschina—the Soviet policy of asserting strict cultural control 
through terror—was implemented throughout the Baltic States.221 
 
216 Police Act Case, para. 31. 
217 See EUR. PARL. ASS., Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Estonia 
4th Sess., Doc. No. 7715 (1996) (discussing Estonia’s ratification of international 
human rights conventions and membership in the Council of Europe). 
218 See supra Sections 4.1.2.1., 4.1.2.2. 
219 See generally Claire Messina, From Migrants to Refugees: Russian, Soviet and 
Post-Soviet Migration, 6 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 620, 622–24 (1994) (discussing Soviet 
policies designed to encourage Russian migration to the Republics, and how this 
migration drastically changed the ethnic composition of the Soviet republics). 
220 LIEVEN, supra note 119, at 183. 
221 Id. at 92. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
 
252 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:1 
As a result of these factors, the large Russophone minority in 
Estonia became associated with the communist occupation.  
Estonia’s desire to be “reborn” as a nation-state manifested itself in 
the resurrection of pre-communist culture and language and a 
rejection of associations with the communist era.222  Constitutional 
issues relating to language or cultural requirements are thus a 
quintessential countermajoritarian policy response to the strong 
preferences of politicians and the population at large to reassert an 
Estonian identity in society after a long period in which it was 
artificially subdued. 
The Estonianization policy institutionalized language as a 
component of citizenship.  Russian and Estonian come from the 
Slavic and Finno-Ugric linguistic families, respectively.  The 
Estonian Constitution provides formal guarantees of minority 
rights but has generally been narrowly interpreted due to public 
opinion and the nationalist Pro-Patria Party’s presence in various 
coalition governments.223  The Language Act and the Local 
Elections Act were policy consequences of this ethno-linguistic 
dynamic. Section 3(3) of the Local Elections Act mandated that 
those seeking to hold public office demonstrate an unspecified 
level of proficiency in the Estonian language. 
In 1997, the National Electoral Committee of Estonia refused to 
officially register Russophone politician Juri Šutenko, thereby 
preventing him from assuming his seat on the Maardu City 
Council, on the grounds that he was not proficient in Estonian.224  
 
222 See Maveety & Grosskopf, supra note 8, at 470 (describing the effort within 
Estonia in the wake of its independence to re-establish its political elite, language, 
and culture). 
223 See, e.g., EESTI VABARIIGI PÕHISEADUS [Constitution] art. 1 (1992) (Est.) 
(“Everyone is equal before the law. No one shall be discriminated against on the 
basis of nationality, race, colour, sex, language, origin, religion, political or other 
opinion, property or social status, or on other grounds.”); Id. art. 50 (“[N]ational 
minorities have the right, in the interests of national culture, to establish self-
governing agencies under conditions and pursuant to procedure provided by the 
National Minorities Cultural Autonomy Act.”); Id. art. 51 (“Everyone has the right 
to address state agencies, local governments, and their officials in Estonian and to 
receive responses in Estonian.  In localities where at least one-half of the 
permanent residents belong to a national minority, everyone has the right to also 
receive responses from state agencies, local governments, and their officials in the 
language of the national minority.”). 
224 Review of the petition of the Harju County Court to declare § 3(3) and § 
26(7)1) of the Local Government Council Election Act, § 5(1) of the Language Act, 
and the Government of the Republic Regulation no. 188 entitled “Enactment of 
the description of the level of proficiency in Estonian necessary to work in the 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/4
 
2009] TOWARD AN INTERPRETIVE MODEL  253 
The petition of the National Electoral Committee was initially 
dismissed by the Harju County Court on the grounds that the 
provisions of the Language Act and Local Government Council 
Election Act requiring Estonian language proficiency were 
incompatible with the Estonian Constitution.225  The case was 
appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The CRC’s reasoning was somewhat different from that in the 
Police Act Case. Although Estonia was a party to several 
international treaties at the time of the ruling that stipulated the 
protection of minority rights, the CRC did not refer to them 
explicitly.  Rather, the Court set out to reconcile internal political 
and legal considerations while under international political 
pressure regarding the rights of the Russian minority.226  It did so 
by implicitly referencing ECHR and ECJ jurisprudence as an 
external source of legitimacy in its elaboration of a requirement of 
necessary proportionality with regard to language laws. 
The Court stressed that the extent of the restriction on liberty 
must be necessary and “not distort the nature of the rights and 
freedoms restricted.”227  The decision noted that “the Estonian 
language is an essential component of the Estonian nation and 
culture, without which the preservation of the Estonian nation and 
culture is not possible.”228  Yet the CRC held that election laws are 
required to be passed by the legislature and thus cannot be 
 
Riigikogu and local government councils” partly invalid (Language Act Case), 
No. 3-4-1-7-98 (Riigikohus [Supreme Court] Nov. 4, 1998). 
225 Id. para 4. 
226 The EU noted that the Language Act may impede the free movement of 
workers and services.  See Regular Report from the Commission on Estonia’s Progress 
Towards Accession, at 15, COM (1999) (stating that the Language Act may have a 
detrimental effect on Community workers and companies, while also potentially 
constituting restriction in the entry and  temporary residence in the territory of 
Community nationals).  The EU and OSCE also noted the problems of Estonian 
Language Laws in multiple other documents dating from 1993.  The first High 
Commissioner on Minorities visited Estonia in 1993 and the OSCE subsequently 
established a mission in Estonia.  See generally ORG. FOR SECURITY AND 
COOPERATION IN EUROPE, HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NATIONAL MINORITIES, REPORT ON 
THE LINGUISTIC RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE 
OSCE AREA (1999) (discussing the linguistic rights of minority groups in many 
nations); ORG. FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, HIGH COMMISSIONER ON 
NATIONAL MINORITIES, THE OSLO RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE LINGUISTIC 
RIGHTS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES & EXPLANATORY NOTE (1998) (listing Estonia as a 
nation in which the dispute between ethnic minorities and central authorities may 
escalate). 
227 Language Act Case, § IV. 
228 Id.  § III, para. 1. 
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delegated to the executive.229  Since both Section 3(3) of the Local 
Elections Act and Section 5(1) of the Language Act empowered the 
executive to set a procedure for ascertaining the level of language 
proficiency without the legislature speaking on the issue, the laws 
were thus unconstitutional grants of legislative power.230 
The result of this decision was to force the Riigikogu to 
reconsider the enactment while under international pressure.  
Indeed, the legislative effort to reform the Local Elections Act and 
Language Act centered on making Estonian policy compatable 
with international human rights standards.  This was expressed by 
numerous members of the Riigikogu during committee and floor 
debates who referenced the opinions of European delegates in 
Estonia.231  The Local Elections Act and Language Act were 
subsequently amended and codified with precise criteria for 
language proficiency.  The 1999 Act was viewed as incompatible 
with both international standards and the Constitution.232  The 
CRC recast the Local Elections Act and Language Act in terms 
which did not preclude domestic political objectives from being 
asserted in an environment which considered the international 
legal obligations and political ramifications. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
International law has had a profound effect on the judicial 
transition in the CEE countries.  Courts throughout the transition 
process utilized international law both formally and informally as 
a source of external legitimacy when ruling on those issues which 
could potentially evoke the greatest response from the public and 
government.  This assertion holds true for countries with judicial 
systems crafted in both the American and Austrian traditions. The 
similarities in the jurisprudence of the Lithuanian Constitutional 
Court and the Estonian National Court are observed 
notwithstanding differing international political contexts; the 
influence of the EU and CoE was more prevalent during the latter 
cases than the former.  These similarities exist despite differing 
methods of challenging the constitutionality of a government act.  
 
229 Id.  § II, para. 1. 
230 Id.  § IV, para. 1. 
231 Maveety & Grosskopf, supra note 8, at 482–85. 
232 See id. at 482 (discussing how the CRC’s recommendations acted as a 
catalyst to debate within Estonia over the constitutionality of these legislative 
acts). 
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Thus, the use of international law as an external source of 
legitimacy can be seen as a greater determinant of judicial 
independence and legitimacy than the formal structure or 
procedures of the legal system. 
The broader implication is that the role of formal guarantees of 
judicial independence and the design of legal system in the 
establishment of judicial independence and legitimacy has been 
somewhat overemphasized in legal thinking and policy 
approaches.  Furthermore, the method of applying international 
law in domestic courts also seems to be somewhat overemphasized 
because of the extensive use of non-binding international norms in 
the courts’ jurisprudence.  The significance of international law as 
an external source of judicial independence and legitimacy, as 
demonstrated by the legal reasoning of various courts, establishes 
that future studies on judicial, political, and economic transitions 
should look to the operation of the court system and judicial 
reasoning therein. 
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